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Introduction 
Forms of political action and identities of political agents differ considerably across Israel 
and the ccupicd Pale tinian Territories. Political actions are violent and nonviolent, 
individual and collective, matcrial and symbolic. 11,ey are organized and coordinated, 
and they arise organically, coming into being through everyday processes of negotiati on 
and urvival . Political actions erect wall and explode busses. They terrorize, traumatize, 
incarcerate, and kill . They write hi story, construct images, identify threats, and name and 
rename. And yet political action also topple walls and transgress borders. They build 
communities. rebuild homes. establish friendships. adju t impressions. upset hierarchies, 
and restore life. Political actions reproduce and resol e connict, and they exacerbate and 
alleviate human sufTering. And just as they difTcr in shape and effect, political actions are 
colored differently by the agent behind them. Political agents are states and individuals, 
political parties and theatre groups, assassins and teachers. They vary in resources. in 
allegiances, and in aims. and they differ in age. in gender, and in class. either political 
actions nor political agents can be captured by rigid typology. They exist in permutation 
and combination, in nux. differing and contradicting across time and space. But ho\\ever 
they shapeshift, both political actions and political agents remain enmeshed in contests of 
recognition , for whether an action or an agcnt i recognized as political is itself ai, ays a 
question of politics. 
This paper, in shon, analyzes and argue for recognition of a particular form of 
political action as exercised by a particular type of political agent in the spatial and 
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symbolic context of "Israel-Palestine." The fonn of political action is everyday and 
primarily symbolic. The type of political agent is youth . The central claim of this paper is 
that Israeli and Palestinian youth exercise a type of everyday, symbolic, and creative 
political agency through which they make and transmit meanings, reveal and constitute 
themselves, build communities, and, ultimately, alter material realities. I call this type of 
agency poetic agency. 
Poetic agency is to be distinguished from traditional conceptions of political 
agency in a number of ways. First, the tenn "political agency," in so far as it is associated 
with canonical concepts of politics which associate politics with the distribution of 
material resources, connotes that political action is concerned with the same, i.e., with the 
manipulation of distributions of material social goods. I Poetic agency, conversely, is 
concerned foremost with the manipulation of meaning and with interventions in symbolic 
systems. It is for this reason, foremost, that I use the tenn "poetic agency." I do not use 
"poetic agency" to suggest that poetic action always involves the creation of poetry. Nor 
do I use the tenn to suggest that poetic action always involves the creation of fonnal art 
works more broadly conceived. Rather, I USe "poetic agency" to suggest that, like the 
poet, poetic agents always operate first on the symbolic plane. However, I do not mean to 
suggest that poetic action is the only type of symbolic action, for a number of other 
features characterize poetic agency. For instance, though not always creating poetry, 
poetic agents are, like poets, necessarily characterized by acts of creation, for, as I argue 
below, poetic agents make new meanings through assertions of difference and through 
the exercise of Arendtian natality. Second, the term "poetic agency" is appropriate for 
I Harold Lasswell defined politics as "who gets what, when, and how" (1936). Canonical political theory, 
especially before the twentieth century, tended to address Laswell 's question in terms of material 
distributions, most notably in works on political economy, as in Locke or Marx, for example. 
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describing the agency I argue for here because, like most poets, poetic agents do their 
work through everyday, often unrecognized acts. Just as most poetry never achieves wide 
readership, most poetic actions go unnoticed and without acclaim. Like quotidian 
compositions, poetic actions make small meanings, often to no more than a small group 
of individuals. Finally, "poetic agency" is a fitting tenm for the agency I wish to describe 
because just as the poet reveals himself or herself to others through his or her poetry, so 
the poetic agent discloses his or her identity through poetic action2 Both the poet and the 
poetic agent present and constitute the self through acts of creative meaning-maIGng. For 
these reasons, I use the tenn "poetic agency" to refer to an agency characterized by 
symbolic, creative, and everyday acts which reveal and constitute the self and build 
relationships. This reference, i.e., my use of the term "poetic, " is intended only as a 
shorthand. It is not intended as a forma/theoretical move. Rather, I deploy the tenm only 
for convenience, using it in attempt to connote in every case the full meaning of the 
complex agency I mean to address. 
Poetic actions differ from canonical political actions in a number of ways. 
Whereas political actions are readily associated with the occasional, the material, and the 
destructive (for example, periodic elections, distributions of wealth, wars and terrorism), 
poetic actions are concerned with the everyday, the symbolic, and the creative (for 
example, negotiating occupation, rapping, and caretaking). Given its distinction from 
canonical political action, it is worth noting why poetic action remains political at all. It 
remains so for two reasons. First, because it involves manipulations of meaning-
2 The revelation of the self that occurs in the act of composition must be understood as a kind of Arendtian 
"disclosure of the 'who. '" As such, I do not mean to suggest that tbe poet necessari ly reveals rumselfor 
herself in a straightforward or deliberate manner through poetry. Rather, the act of revelation is something 
much more subtle. Only rarely is it even in tentional. 
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especially manipulations of meaning related to personal identity- poetic action directly 
affects the di stributions of symbolic social goods individuals receive: for example, 
recognition, respect, reputation, and so forth, Second, as a consequence of manipulating 
the symbolic world, poetic action impacts secondarily material realities, By altering 
systems of meaning, poetic action affects, for example, how an individual will be 
perceived and, consequently, what material goods that individual will receive, For 
instance, poetic action which inscribes the category of youth with meanings of 
competence and knowledge will increase the likelihood that youth will be included in 
arenas of economic and political influence, By altering distributions of symbolic goods 
and by altering material realities as a consequence of altering meanings, poetic action 
remains political action despite the differences it shares with canon.ical conceptions of the 
latter. 
This paper is in two parts: the first is a theoretical dialectic; the second is an 
analysis of case studies, 
The section presenting the case studies was written firstJ In this second part of 
the paper, I present evidence of Israeli and Palestinian youth exercising the type of poetic 
agency for which this paper argues, The case studies are based upon fieldwork conducted 
in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in the surruner of?O I 0, In the field, I 
conducted in-depth interviews with Israeli and Palestinian youth, I participated in focus 
groups with these youth, I met with them at universities and at nongovernmental 
organizations, I visited with them in their homes, I spent time with them in refugee 
camps, My fieldwork was also observational. I observed walls and checkpoints, artwork 
J A version of the case study analysis was submined as a writing sample in the author's graduate school 
appljcations in the fall of2010. 
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and rap, and cond itions of li ving and working. I noted how Israeli and Palestinian youth 
interact with and negotiate the spacial and symbolic architecture which surrounds them, 
manipulating it and being manipulated by it as they live out their li ves. 
Following the period of fieldwork, this paper's inquiry was not whether political 
agency was exercised by Israeli and Palestinian youth, for it was evident agency was 
present and was being exerci sed by youth daily. Instead, the inquiry accepted the 
presence of youth agency as a given, and turned its attention onto the nature, onto the 
specific character, onto the methods of utilization, the sources of emergence, and the 
avenues of effect of thi s particular political agency-an agency which was not at all 
canonical or necessarily recognized as such, but yet one I observed in action again and 
again. The investigation, in short , became an inquiry into the nature o f the agency I 
witnessed. This paper 's composition, then, is necessarily dialectic: traveling back and 
forth between a theory of political agency and empirical observation. 
Thi s paper's first part consists of the theoretical work. In thi s part o f the paper, I 
build the analytic tool with which the case studies are read, namely, poetic agency. The 
account of poetic agency presented here is built by synthesizing certain tenets of three 
theoretical systems. The most important of these systems is that of Hannah Arendt. 
Arendt ' s account of action is the starting point for the theoretical dialectic. Arendtian 
action, I argue, is, of necessity, always politi cal action. Taking a defin ition of political 
action from Arendt, the nex t move introduces James Scott 's account of everyday 
resistance, not so much as a corrective to Arendt, but rather as an illuminating addition, 
for the two systems are. in the main, not contradictory. From Scott , we take the 
suggestion that Arendtian action will most often assume an everyday fo rm, i.e., most 
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manifestations of Arendtian action are not to be found in occasional , extraordinary 
events, but rather in quotidian acts which often go overlooked. Finally, in the work of 
Michel Foucault, we find a kind of "microphysics" which is able to explain in detail 
much of "the how" and "the why" of the preceding theory. Through his theories of power 
and discourse, Foucault is able to explain expli citly how it is that meanings are political, 
how it is that actors access the symbolic world , what the characteristics of this symbolic 
world are, and how it is that operating within it both limits and makes possible political 
action. Finally, through his thought on the care for the self, Foucault provides an 
additional function poetic agency might fulfill , namely, not merely the revelation of the 
actor we find in Arendt, but rather the very constitution of the actor through practices of 
discursively circumscribed self invention. 
The three theoretical systems put to work here were selected because of thei r 
correspondence to the case studies in the paper' s second part. Their appropriateness 
emerged from the power they possess to explain the agency I locate in Israeli and 
Palestinian youth . In isolation, each of the three theoretical systems is incapable of doing 
the degree of interpretative work that is possible through their conjunction. The analytic 
tool which emerges from their synthesis, poetic agency, is, I hope, able to unpack a bit of 
the complexity contained within the political actions of Israeli and Palestinian youth. 
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The Research Problem 
Youth agency has been articulated by researchers both in general and in the specific 
context of Israel-Palestine. In this respect, this paper's insight is not so much that Israeli 
and Palestinian youth exercise political agency as it is that Israeli and Palestinian youth 
exercise a particular kind of political agency. Nonetheless, before beginning the 
theoretical and empirical analyses of that agency- poetic agency- it is worth pausing to 
pose the research problem with a greater shade of detail. Here, I present examples of how 
youth agency has been theorized in general and how it has been theorized in the Israeli-
Palestinian context. Finally, I provide a small sample of case study evidence. I take up 
these matters at the outset in order that the questions they introduce about political 
agency might arise in antecedence to the theoretical dialectic. 
One area of research in which youth agency has received sustained attention is in 
the field of peace and conflict studies. One of main reasons for this attention has been the 
phenomenon of child soldiering. The child soldier, as, anlOng many things, a wielder of 
violence and terror, appears to be a clear demonstration of the possibility for youth 
agency. While it is the case that child soldiers are often coerced into action, this does not 
necessarily deprive child soldiers of the agency they seem to wield. Rather, it suggests 
only that outside forces have pressured them to use their agency toward certain ends. The 
type of political agency the child soldier exercises in violence, however, is markedly 
different from the type of political agency this paper locates among certain Israeli and 
Palestinian youth. Whereas the latter type is characterized by creative, symbolic 
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transmission, the fonner is characterized by material destruction and terror. Given this 
di [ference, the work of Siobhan McEvoy-Levy provides an account of youth agency 
more fit for this paper than the account arising from the case of the child soldier. For 
McEvoy-Levy, youth in contexts of anned connict exercise many kinds of political 
agency, one of which departs drastically from the agency discursively associated with the 
icon of the child soldier, namely youth agency for peacebuilding.' In her work, McEvoy-
Levy has focused on those instances of youth agency which she identifies as agency for 
resolving violence and building peace. Though giving deference to the narratives of 
youth themselves rather than protracted theorizing, McEvoy-Levy does, at times, offer 
explicit explanations of the sources. mechanisms of deployment, and conditions of 
actualization ofa certain kind of youth agency utilized for peacebuilding: 
Youth, particularly children, are passive agents of conflict reproduction . 
. .. But youth are also active agents of connict reproduction when they are 
participants in armed connict and when they act as transmitters of 
knowledge and creators of meaning and culture. 0 other group in society 
simultaneously interacts with school, home, the street, the workforce, 
cultural or social institutions like the church or voluntary and leisure 
organizations, and the military in the way youth do .... [Youth] create a 
variety of narratives that are transmitted to peers, to younger siblings, and 
also to adults. (2006: 284) 
4 I use the language "discursively associated" and "icon" here to indicate the contingent, power.dependent 
nature of the chi ld soldier image in the Western imaginary. Child soldiers are, in fact, children too, as it 
were, in some cases. for instance. building communities of care amongst themselves in violent conditions 
(Singer 2006). 
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For McEvoy-Levy, youth agency for peacebuilding is primarily a symboli c agency 
involving the manipulati on and the creation of meaning. Because it obtains under 
cond itions of interaction with a number of institutions and actors, youth agency is able to 
transmit meanings across multiple sites, thereby heightening the effi cacy of youth 's 
symbolic actions. Youth agency, as articulated by McEvoy-Levy, shares much in 
common with the poetic agency this paper ascribes to Israeli and Palestinian youth, 
especially in its emphasis on the mak ing of meaning. Furthermore, McEvoy-Levy's 
work, to the extent it focuses on the economic and political marginalization of youth, also 
does considerable work for explaining why it might be that so many youth, especiall y 
those abstaining from violence, must tum to poetic agency as an outlet for political 
expression. Accepting McEvoy-Levy's main tenet- that youth 's political agency is often 
symbolic in character- poetic agency, in the main, does not oppose but rather 
complements her system. Digging deep into theory, poetic agency excavates in detail 
micro-physics through which symbolic agency operates, and it adds a number of new 
emphases and mechanisms to the account of youth agency McEvoy-Levy presents. 
While youth agency, as a uni versal phenomenon, has received attention in peace 
and conflict studies, attention has also been given to the subject in the specific contex t of 
Israel-Palestine. As in the case of the child soldier, much of thi s analysis has been 
focused on cases of overt violence, most notably martyrdom operations (see for example 
Abufarha 2009; Hasso 2002). However, attention has also been given to political agency 
which ali gns more closely with poetic agency. Especiall y notable here is the work of 
Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian who has written extensively on the political action of 
Palestinian women, especially young Palestinian women: 
I I 
• 
My specific focus on young women is important for the obvious reason 
that these women are the future of Palestine, but also for the less obvious 
reason of examining the ways in which the quotidian and colonial 
conllation of state/family/woman/property is being disrupted by the 
younger generation, for such disruptions are occurring. These young 
women are fighting with determination to survive and are valiantly 
attempting to change the norms . . .. Young women are refusing to accept 
roadblocks that prevent them from reaching schoo ls; refusi ng home 
imprisonment; refusing early marriage as a means of surviving economic 
hardship or social insecurity. They are creating new ways to play, cope, 
share, walk, live. (2009: 70-71) 
For Shalhoub-Kevorkian, young Palestinian women are exercising agency that is 
characterized by an everyday nature. Quotidian acts such as going to school and refusing 
marriage are taken as politicized forms of "disruption" against military occupation and 
Palestinian patriarchy. In addition to noting the everyday nature of political agency for 
young Palestinian women, Shalhoub-Kevorkian holds that "agency is inherently 
situational," that it will take different forms at different places and times, and that 
therefore analysts should be suspicious of universalizing, imperialist accounts of what 
ought to count as political action (2009: 50-54). "The contribution of women frontliners 
to resistance," she writes, " is usually invisible to outsiders and for the most part goes 
unnoticed, but it exhibits a great deal of power and resilience" (?009: I). Whenjudged 
against political actions as conceived in the West, e.g., mass demonstrations or terrorism, 
Shalhoub-Kevorkian's examples of "frontline resistance" are radical departures: 
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Being a front liner means being in a place of constant combat- both 
material and psychological- that enervates all the energies that one has to 
resist, yet these women continue not just to resist but also to re-create .... 
The frontliner can be a woman who is lining up or is humiliated at a 
checkpoint, a woman singing her children to sleep in the middle of night 
raids and incursions, one selling yogurt to make some additional money 
and buy food for her children, a woman giving birth at a checkpoint 
because she has been prevented from reaching a hospital, or one 
screaming and crying in cou.rt while refusing to accept the law's failure to 
protect her rights, and more. (2009: 34) 
Although it might be tempting to agree with Shalhoub-Kevorkian that each of these cases 
is indeed an instance of resistance, disruption, or political action, we must first, I think, 
inquire as to why it is this might be so. If a woman selling yogurt is exercising political 
agency, what is it about that particular act that makes it political and what is the nature of 
the agency which is being exercised? If going to school and singing lullabies are political 
actions, are they always so, or only in certain cases? What di stinguishes the certain cases? 
If such a wide variety of everyday acts qualify as political action, does the category retain 
any meaning or utility? And how are we to conceptually accommodate within the 
category of political action both the likes of giving birth at a military checkpoint and 
pulling a lever for the electoral candidate of one's preference? While, in the end, a theory 
of poetic agency will agree with halhoub-Kevorkian in recognizing the political agency 
of school goers and yogurt sellers, its development through theoretical dialectic will 
allow us to defend Shalhoub-Kevorkian's claims from a position of conceptual clarity. In 
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the process, we will answer why it is that certain everyday, invisible, and symbolic 
actions ought be considered political. We will arrive at an account of poetic agency 
which will reveal not only the possibilities of political agency for young Palestinian 
women and youth in general, but also the possibilities of political agency for the 
members of any marginalized group, no matter how asynunetrical the relations of 
domination. 
From these accounts of youth 
agency, our research problem 
emerges. To make it more salient still , 
I have included Figure 1 here at the 
outset. Taken in Bethlehem's 
Dheisheh refugee camp, the 
photograph is of a collage of young 
handprints shaped to form a 
"'igure I. Photograph by the author. 
Palestinian flag. The image, together with its inscriptions, "we'll make our history," "free 
Palestine," and "children of Dheisheh," could elicit any number of readings. If 
considering whether the creation of thi s mural should be classified an act of political 
agency, we might reasonably ask a number of questions: What were the intentions of the 
actors? What have been the consequenes of the mural 's creation? Do either those who 
made this piece or those who interpret it view it as a political entity? In this case, the 
answers to these questions are largely unknown. Poetic agency, for its part, can do 
nothing to answer them. However, poetic agency does give us something else, namely a 
criterion by which we could decide whether thi s act ought to count as political action if 
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we were 10 find answers 10 our queslions. Furthermore, an accounl of poetic agency will 
lell us what queslions we ought 10 ask in the first place if with what we are concerned is 
making such a judgement. For ils ability 10 analyze in-depth Ihe polilical character of 
aesthetic works such as the piece in Figure I, a theory of poetic agency is especially 
appropriale for applicalion to the context of Israel-Palesline, for within this physical and 
symbolic space visual, spoken, and livcd aesthelics pervade.s 
S The focus on formal aesthetics in trus particular example is not meant to suggest that poetic agency is 
necessarily concerned with the production offormnl artwork. While poetic agency can certainly manifest 
itself in the creation of works of art, in need always do so. Material aesthetics receive anention here and 
elsewhere because they are often relatively easy for the researcher to pinpoint and analyze. However. other 
creations and manipulations of meaning-even those never given explicit artistic or physical 
represcntation--can also qualify as acts of poetic agency. For example, manipulations of discourses of 
youth (described below) will often occur without directly correlative physical manifestations. 
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A Theory of Poetic Agency 
The politicallheory of Hannah Arendt provides a foundation upon which a theory of 
poetic agency can be constructed. In The Human Condition, Arendt offers a detailed 
philosophy of political action and political agency. It is adopted here for its explanatory 
power, i.e., for its ability to give a cogent interpretation of the empirical observations 
presented in the paper's second part. Arendt's system is also adopted here due to its 
suitability for synthesis with the theoretical systems that follow. Poetic agency is not, in 
the main, a system of corrections to Arendt; rather, it is mostly a system of additions and 
reconsiderations, a unique completion of an unfinished frame. It is from Arendt's 
philosophy that the theory of poetic agency takes its central tenets. What is political 
action? Who is a political agent? Under what conditions is agency exercised? The 
remainder of this section addresses these questions through exposition and interpretation 
of Arendt's philosophy.6 Following Arendt, I argue that every instance of action is 
necessarily political action. Furthermore, action is necessarily creative and symbolic, for 
action always makes meaning and reveals the identiry of its agent. It is from its 
interventions in systems of meaning especially those systems of meaning concerning 
personal identity- that act ion derives its political character. 
Arendt devotes most of The Human Condition to theorizing what she identifies as 
the three central activities of human life, what she calls the vila aCliva: labor, work, and 
action. Each of the vila aCliva corresponds to a fundanlental condition of hwnan 
6 My reading of Arendt has been aided by consultation of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
specifically the entry "Hannah Arendt" (d'Entreves 2006). 
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existence: life, worldliness, and plurality. Labor, corresponding to life, consists of those 
activities which sustain life, for example, eating, drinking, and procreating. Work. 
corresponding to worldliness, consists of activities which maintain the habitability the 
world, for example, building tools, constructing homes, and so forth. Action, 
corresponding to the condition of plurality, is the most complex of the vila aeliva. It is in 
her account of action that Arendt offers a theory of political action and political agency. 
For Arendt, action is grounded in the condition of plurality. The condition of 
plurality is characterized by two features: equality and di stinctness. "Plurality is the 
condition of human action because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that 
nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live" (1958: 8). 
Plurality refers first to the fact that all humans share in common the condition of being 
human. Hence, plurality refers to equality. Second, plurality refers to the fact lhat all 
humans are unique. No two individuals will be alike in every respect, in virtue of 
differences in time, space, and circumstance. Hence, plurality refers to di stinctness. These 
two characteristics of plurality are important for Arendt, for it is through them that 
political action and political agency can emerge. 
Political action and political agency would be impossible if it were not for 
distinctness. For Arendt, each individual enters the world as a person unlike anyone 
other. Every individual is unique, and it is because of thi s uniqueness that human action 
is possible. There is a "new beginning inherent in birth" (1958: 9), and it is in virtue of 
this new beginning that human agency can occur: 
With word and deed we insert ourselves into the human world, and thi s 
insertion is like a second birth, in which we confirm and take upon 
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ourselves the naked fact of our original physical appearance .. ,. Its 
impulse springs from the beginning which came into the world when we 
were born and to which we respond by beginning something new on our 
own ini tiative .... The fact that man is capable of action means that the 
unexpected can be expected from him, that he is able to perform what is 
infinitely improbable. And this again is possible only because each man in 
unique, so that with each birth something uniquel y new comes into the 
world. (1958: 177-178) 
Arendt calls this process of beginning "natality." atali ty refers not only to the beginning 
of a new individual at birth. but also to the proce s by which an individual initiates new 
beginnings after birth.7 For Arendt, action is defined as the realization of this process, as 
the "actualization of the human condi tion of natality" (1958: 178). Action takes place 
when an individual exercises the capaci ty of natality. when an individual begins 
omething new or creates a reality. Action does thi s by asserting distinctnes ,and in so 
doing action brings into being something which did not exist before. For Arendt. the 
exercise of natality through action i nothing less than freedom it elf ( I 958: 177). 
Provisionally, then. action can be defined as the actualization of freedom. as the act 
through which natality is exercised by the individual. Consequently. agency, which is 
nothing other than the potential to exerci se action, obtai ns in every individual with the 
abi lity to actuali ze freedom. Because this requires nothing other than the exercise of 
natality, el'ery IlIIlIIan person possesses the potellfiai of Arelldtian agency, so far defined, 
1 While procreation falls under the condition of labor. natality is bound up with the condition of action. 
What might be taken as a contradiction-that the nct of birth seems to belong to two categories-should 
rather, (think, be taken as a connection suggest ing that the act of birth is necessary for both sustaining life 




for natality obtains through distinctness, a quality in which every human person 
participates. 
If action and agency arise from distinctness, their political character, i.e., that 
which makes action political action and agency political agency, arises from equality. 
Equality, as a characteristic of plurality, refers to the fact that all individuals share the 
quality of being human (1958: 8). Equality also refers to the fact that "men, not Man, live 
on the earth and inhabit the world" (1958: 7). Equality, then, means not only that there is 
a shared human condition, but also that this shared human condition is participated in by 
a plural number of individuals. In other words, living in a world which is lived in by 
others constitutes an essential characteristic of the condition of plurality. It is thi s aspect 
of plurality which allows action to take on its political character. Action, because it 
necessarily occurs under conditions of plurality, is always interpersonal and 
communicative: 
Action, as di stinguished from fabrication, is never possible in iso lation; to 
be isolated is to be deprived of the capacity to act. Action and speech need 
the surrounding presence of others no less than fabrication needs the 
surrounding presence of nature for its material, and of a world in which to 
place the fini shed product. Fabrication is surrounded by and in constant 
contact with the world: action and speech are surrounded by and in 
constant contact with the web of acts and the words of other men. (1958: 
188) 
Action is necessarily interpersonal. Jus.! as fabrication- the manipulation of the physical 
world in the activity of work- must obtain within a physical world which can be shaped 
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and reshaped, so must action obtain within a symbolic world which can be manipulated. 
The presence of others is required if action is to take on significance. Action is "relevant 
only through the spoken word," for it is through the spoken word that an one "identifies 
himself as the actor, announcing what he does, has done, and intends to do" (1958: 179). 
The assertion of distinctness which actuali zes natality cannot occur in the absence of an 
audience to whom distinctness can be asserted . For Arendt, action must be symbolic or it 
is not action at all (1958: 178-179). Arendtian action, then, has the following necessary 
conditions thus far: the actualization of natality and the making of meaning. As the basis 
of distinctness and the plurality, it is the human condition of plurality that allows both of 
these conditions to be realized. 
The political character of action is bound up with its symbol ic quality. For 
Arendt, "speech is what makes man a political being" (1958: 3). It is through a particular 
foml of speech that action is politicized, one which Arendt calls the "disclosure of the 
'who'" (1958: 179). 
For Arendt, it is only through action, not through labor or work, that individuals 
can meaningfully assert their distinctness. While labor and work might reveal the "what" 
of an individual, for example, "his qualities, gifts, and talents," they cannot reveal the 
"who" (1958: 179). The disclosure of the "who" takes place only in action. " In acting and 
speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively thei r unique personal identities and 
thus make their appearance in the human world" ( 1958: 179). It is through the reve lation 
of an individual's "unique personal identity" that the "who" is disclosed. This is a process 
of action, for in it natal ity is actualized and meaning is transmitted. The disclosure of the 
"who" is in every case a political action: 
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The disclosure of the "who" through speech, and the setting ofa new 
beginning through action, always fall into an already existing web where 
their immediate consequences can be felt. Together, they start a new 
process which eventually emerges as the unique life story of the 
newcomer, affecting uniquely the life stories of all those with whom he 
comes into contact. (1958: 184) 
The disclosure of the "who" is necessarily political because it carries "immediate 
consequences" which impact the lives others. An assertion of distinctness always 
involves the advancement of a claim. Because it is an attempt at manipulating the 
distribution of resources in the symbolic world, every disclosure of the "who" is a 
political action. Furthermore, for Arendt, every action must be a disclosure of the "who": 
"Without the di sclosure of the agent in the act, action loses its specific character and 
becomes one form of achievement among others" (1958: 180). If every action is a 
disclosure of the "who," and ifevery di sclosure of the "who" is a political action, then 
not only is it the case that every action is a disclosure of the "who," but also that every 
Arendtian action is a political action. Three conditions, then, are necessary for Arendtian 
action: actualization of natality, making of meaning, and disclosure of the "who." Each of 
these is grounded in the human condition of plurality. 
A final feature of action is its ability to actualize, through power, the "space of 
appearance." The space of appearance is a political space, but one entirely immaterial. It 
is a space for deliberation and creation, and it is immediately dissolved if these activities 
cease. The space of appearance is brought into being whenever individuals gather 
together and participate collectively in a particular form of action, namely power. 
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Arendtian power exists only in actualization. It disappears immediately when individuals 
cease to participate in action together, even if the individuals remain physically gathered. 
It is through a particular type of collective action that power comes to be: 
Power is actualized only where word and deed have not parted company, 
where words are not empty and deeds not brutal, where words are not used 
to veil intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to violate 
and destroy but to establish relations and create new realities. (1958: 200) 
Power is a creative, non-coercive force . It shares meaning, builds relationships, and sets 
into motion processes of beginning. Power is a constructive force. It is antithetical to 
violence. Although "violence can destroy power, it can never become a substitute for it" 
(1958: 202). The actualization of power brings into being the space of appearance. 
Located within this space is the perf0n113nCe of "organized remembrance," collective 
inscription of meaning onto the conditions, events, and inhabitants of the world (1958: 
198). It is within the space of appearance that human community is built and sustained. 
Here is a space in which "I appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not 
merely like other living or inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly" (1958: 
198-199). Brought into being by constructive, collective action, i.e., by power, the space 
of appearance is a symbolic, interpersonal, political space through which individuals 
make meanings, build relationships, and create new realities. 
The political theory of Arendt offers an account of political action and political agency. 
In doing so, it provides a foundation upon which an account of poetic agency can be 
built. Arendtian action is that which actualizes natality, transmits meaning, and discloses 
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the "who." Put another way, Arendtian action is characterized by creative, symbolic acts 
which assert the unique identity ofan actor. For Arendt, action is, of necessity, always 
political action. Political agency inheres in anyone with the potential to exerci se political 
action. In virtue of the human condition of plurality, all human persons are political 
agents. Occasionally, individuals, by collectively exercising constructive action, actualize 
power and the space of appearance. Through thi s space, human persons build 
relationships, make meaning, and initiate new processes of beginning. 
Arendt' s theories of political action and political agency can accommodate traditional 
impressions of the political. The creative, symbolic, and revelatory character of Arendtian 
action is present, at least in part, in democratic elections, social movements, deliberative 
democracy, and so forth. Even certain acts of "polit ical violence"- altbough not 
actualizations of power- might be taken as Arendtian actions in so far as such acts 
initiate beginnings, convey meanings, and assert identities.8 Arendt ' s system, then, can 
explain the political nature nf acts traditionally considered political. However, the acts 
presented in this paper's second part- acts of Israeli and Palestinian youth- might not 
readily be regarded as political actions proper within the tradition. Elections, social 
8 Note all terminology: "Arendtian action" refers to the account of action developed in the preceding 
section. It has three necessary conditions and the possibility of actualizing Arendtian power. "Political 
action," while used synonymously with "Arendtian action" in the previous section, is, for the remainder of 
this paper's first part, at times a substitute concept which will undergo sustained development, i.e., 
"political action" can substitute for "poetic action" as the latter is thus far developed in a certain period of 
the paper. At other times, "political action" is used as a generic concept- as a term used to mark instances 
of action commonly believed to be political, but which are perhaps not political in the stricter senses we are 
considering here. "Action;' used by itself, refers to this generic usage. "Act" and "acts" are reserved 
exclusively for phenomena which are decidedly not political actions or which might be political actions. In 
the laner case, we are typically trying to ascertain if an "act" is in fact a political action. 
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movements, acts of terrorism, and the like, share in common a certain set of 
characteristics. They involve and impact many individuals. They do not happen often but 
only on rare occasions: their occurrences are periodic, historic, or horrific. Moreover, 
these political actions are recognized as political. They are bestowed the designation by 
commentators, specialists, and human communiti es. However, the acts of Israeli and 
Palestinian youth, at least those presented below, do not share this set of characteristics. 
They do not happen on rare occasions, but with regularity. Furthermore, the political 
nature ofthese acts is often unrecognized and denied. To make the case that these acts are 
nonetheless political actions, the work of James COli is introduced here as an addition to 
the Arendtian system developed thus far. The synthesis, drawing upon SCOll ' S account of 
"everyday resistance:' begins our dialectic, adding to our nascent theory of poetic agency 
considerable power for explaining acts such as those of Israel i and Palestinian youth. 
It is in contrast to hi ghly organized political actions that everyday resistance is 
theorized by SCOll . oling that revolutions and mass movements have taken the fore for 
analysts, con ob erves that most political action is not nearly so organized or collective 
in character. The familiarity of the middle clas with organized politics. the appeal of 
explosive events, and the availability of information to researchers- factors such as these 
have caused actions to be taken as political only if they are massive, revolutionary. or 
easily pinpointed (1985: xv-xvi). However, such a conception of political action in fact 
overlooks the majority of the phenomenon, not recognizing small , individual, and 
everyday occurrences of political action. Scott, who is concerned specifically with that 
type of political action known as "resistance;' writes the following of its quotidian 
manifestations, those which he calls "everyday forms of resistance": 
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Most forms of this struggle stop well short of outright collective defiance. 
Here I have in mind the ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups: 
foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, fal se compliance, pilfering, 
feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so on .... They require 
little or no coordination and planning; they make use of implicit 
understandings and informal networks; they often represent a form of 
individual self-help; they typically avoid any direct, symbolic 
confrontation with authority .... Everyday forms of resistance make no 
headlines. But just as millions ofanthozoan polyps create, willy-nilly, a 
coral reef, so do the multiple acts of peasant insubordination and evasion 
create political and economic barrier reefs of their own. ( 1985: xvi-xvii) 
Everyday forms of resistance are undertaken by individuals and small groups, not mass 
movements. Typically, they are deployed by members of marginalized groups. Everyday 
resistance is characterized by being spontaneous and organic. It is initiated by resisters 
themselves, and spreads between them through shared understandings. Acts of everyday 
resistance are not necessarily "enlightened" or "principled": they include the likes of theft 
and violence, and it is often through the pursuit of self-interest that resistance is 
undertaken. Notably, these acts do not usually challenge their opposition directly, but in 
secret and deceit. Although relatively marginal in iso lation, acts of everyday resistance 
form substantial political and economic forces through amalgamation and through 
inspiration of further resistance. 
The context from which Scott theorizes colors his account in particular ways. His 
examples of everyday resistance foot dragging, pilfering, and the like are based upon 
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his observations of peasants in a Malaysian village. The particular forms of everyday 
resistance exercised by these peasants are functions of the unique relations of 
subordination they experience with landowners. Thus, while the general tenets of Scott's 
account of everyday resistance (for example, its everyday character, its lack of 
coordination) might be easily translatable to other contexts, the particular examples he 
provides might not be replicated elsewhere. Everyday resistance will take different forms 
depending on context and upon particular relations of power. That this is the case will be 
illustrated by the case studies ofisraeli and Palestinian youth. However, a correction to 
Scott's theory is suggested already in the work of Arendt. 
For Scott, everyday resistance is characterized by seeking immediate, material 
ends. It does not typically advance its claims in symbolic space: "Where everyday 
resistance most strikingly departs from other forms of resistance is in its implicit 
disavowal of public and symbolic goals" (1985: 33). This theoretical tenet is in line with 
Scott's contention that everyday resistance is typically clandestine, subverting in secret so 
as not to provoke a response from concentrated power. Unlike other general features of 
Scott's theory of resistance- for instance, his insistence that it can emerge through 
everyday actions- thi s strand of the theory seems heavily dependent on the Malaysian 
context. Ifpeasants avoid "direct, symbolic confrontation" with Malaysian landlords, it is 
because this mode of interaction obtains in virtue of the circumstance's particular power 
relations, not because thi s mode of interaction inheres in everyday resistance. Following 
Arendt, all political action is necessarily symbolic. And although Scott might claim that 
in the case of the Malaysian peasants the symboli sm is limited to symbolic transmission 
among the peasantry through " implicit understandings and informal networks," he would 
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have to concede that given a different system of power relations there is no reason why 
everyday resistance might not take on a thoroughly symbolic character. If there was no 
threat of response, if there was a guarantee of free speech, if a system of repression was 
confident in its strength and did not desire to undertake new repressions which might 
shatter its stability- in these cases symbolic everyday resislance would not merely be 
possible but perhaps be the dominant form everyday resistance would assume. While the 
efficacy of symbolic political action will be addressed in the paper's next part, it is here 
important to note only that symbolic political action and everyday political action are by 
no means incompatible. Indeed, as I will argue, it is, in the main, through manipulation of 
the symbolic world that everyday political action is exercised by Israeli and Palestinian 
youth . It is through nothing other than the symbolic transmission Arendt identifies in all 
political action that the " implicit understandings and informal networks" Scott describes 
can arise at all. The "political and economic barrier reefs" formed by everyday resistance 
could not come into being except through a space of appearance in which individual 
"anthozoan polyps" unite in collective, constructive action. As Scott himself observes, 
there are no "unmoved movers" in everyday resistance, for thoughts of resistance 
circulate across consciousnesses in dynamic with a changing material world (1958: 38). 
In short, while Arendt demonstrates that everyday resistance is necessarily bound up with 
the making of meaning, Scott, through hi s own account, reveals a mode of practices 
through which political action, and consequently meaning making, can be exercised 
daily. 
Another point on which Arendt and Scott can productively encounter is on the 
issue of intention. In conceptualizing resistance, one of the more difficult questions with 
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which Scott is concerned is whether resistance needs to be intentional in order to be 
resistance. Here, two issues are at stake. First, does an intention need to be of a certain 
kind if the action it corresponds to is to be considered resistance? Second, is it possible 
that an act might be one of resistance even if there is no intention behind it at all? 
On tile first of these questions, Arendt and Scott offer si milar answers. For Scott, 
acts of everyday resistance "often represent a fo rm of individual self-help" (1985: xvi). 
Everyday resistance is exercised because it simultaneously benefits the wellbeing of the 
resister Gnd contributes toward the ultimate deconstruction of the repressive system. The 
peasant who steal s from his landlord, for instance, not only increases the capital with 
which food and supplies can be purchased immediately, but also increases, albeit 
incrementally, the resources the peasantry has to sustain itself in its struggle against the 
land owners. For Scott, " it is precisely the fu sion of self-interest and resistance that is the 
vital force animating the resistance of peasants and proletarians" (1985: 295). On this 
point, Arendt agrees: "most words and deeds are about some worldly reality in addition 
to being a disclosure of the acting and speaking agent" (1958: 182). Arendtian action, 
then, like everyday resi stance, does its work on two levels. It is through the first level, 
i.e., through self-interested manipulations of the world, that actors exert themselves on 
the second level, the space of disclosure. Of course, there is nothing to prevent an 
individual from disclosure which is not self-interested, just as there is nothing to prevent 
acts of everyday resistance which come at the expense of a resister. Assertions of 
difference in a hostile environment, for example, or acts of everyday resistance 
undertaken against one's own privileged class, for instance, demonstrate that the norms 
argued for by Arendt and Scott are just that-standards which can be departed from . 
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A second question of intention, more difficult than the first, is whether intention 
must be present at all in order for an act to qualify as an act of resistance. And though I 
have delayed raising it, a similar question is important for Arendt, namely the following: 
Can action be exercised in the absence of intention? 
For Scott, intention seems to be a necessary condition for resistance. Granted, he 
does not set the bar very hi gh. As noted above, Scott argues that an intention can be both 
self-interested and resistant. However, because Scott does not wish to tie the 
consequences of an act to its status as resistance ( 1985: 294-295), it would seem that an 
act of resistance cannot be purely self-interested. If consequences do not determine 
resistance, then the necessary condition for resistance must be some kind of intention. For 
Scott, thi s intention can be so faint as to be almost completely unconscious: " their 
intentions may be so embedded in the peasant subculture and in the routine, taken-for-
granted struggle to provide for the subsistence and survival of the household as to remain 
inarticulate. The fi sh do not talk about the water" ( 1985: 301). In virtue of nothing more 
than being forced to navigate a common repressive condition, a resistant intention can be 
actualized . Participation in a "climate of opinion" is sufficient intention for resistance 
(1985: 300).9 As I will argue, it is precisely thi s kind ofintention--<>ne that is "routine," 
" taken-for granted," and saturated into the culture- that is often behind the political 
action of Palestinian youth. 
9 Scott's claim that intention can ari se from a "climate of opinion" gives rise to a further question regarding 
intention, namely, What is the space in which intention obtains? In theory of mind, intention has 
traditionally been located within the mind of an individual. !fScon is taken as suggesting that in a "climate 
of opinion" intention arises in a sort of collective mind, then his argument seems dubious. However, a more 
generous reading could take Scon as suggesting that systems of interpersonal meaning ("climates of 
opinion") systemically plant intentions ofa subtle sort in the minds of individuals within subordinate 
groups. On this more plausible reading, Scon's argument seems coherent. 
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Whereas Scott argues that intention is necessary fo r resistance, Arendt suggests 
intention is nol necessary for acti on. As noted, Arendt believes that intent ion can be 
mixed with self-interest in the exercise of disclosure. However, Arendt also maintai ns 
that in most cases, actors are entirely incapable of disclosing the "who" intentionally: 
The disclosure of "who" in contradi stinction to "what" somebody is- his 
qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings, which he may display or hidee-
is implicit in everything somebody says or does. It can be hidden onl y in 
complete silence and perfect passivity, but its disclosure can almost never 
be achieved as a wil fu l purpose, as though one possessed and could 
dispose of this "who" in the same manner he has and can dispose of his 
qualities. On the contrary, it is more than likely that the "who," which 
appears so clearly and unmistakably to others, remains hidden from the 
person himself.. .always looking over his shoulder from behind and thus 
visible only to those he encounters. (1958: 179-180) 
Disclosing the "who," then, is almost never an intentional process. Ind ividuals rarely 
succeed in grasping their unique identities, and thus they cannot easil y intend the 
circumstances of disclosure. For Arendt, the inability to recognize one's own distinctness 
arises from the condition of plurality and from the unpredictability of action. No one is 
ever "the author or producer of his own life story" (1958: 184), for all individuals ex ist 
within a plurality where "every reaction becomes a chain reaction and where every 
process is the cause of a new process (1958: 190). The unique identity of the actor is 
itself in flux, and so it can rarely be captured fo r intentional disclosure. For si milar 
reasons, i.e., the condition of plurality, neither the actualization of natali ty nor the making 
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of meaning require intention fo r their exercise. In virtue of living among others, 
individuals can set into motion processes of beginning and transmit meaning without ever 
intending to do so. Political action, then, can be exercised unintentionally. 10 
The break which occurs between action and resistance along lines of intention 
indicates that the terms are not synonymous. Although all resistance is political action, 
not all political action is resistance. Resistance is actuali zed under a stricter set of 
requirements. First, the intention to resist must accompany the fulfillment of all three of 
the necessary conditions for political action. Following Scott, the intention to resist may 
be so faint as to be barely perceptible, but it must be present nonetheless in the case of 
resistance. Second, resistance must possess an adversarial qual ity which is exerted from 
below: "only those survival strategies that deny or mitigate claims from appropriating 
classes can be called resistance" (1985: 302). Conversely, political action, as when it is 
exercised in the actualization of Arendtian power, need be neither adversarial nor 
vertical. Scott' s system, then, equips us not only with the category of the "everyday," but 
also with a concept of resistance that is di stinct from political action. 
Scott' s theory of everyday resistance adds a particular emphasis to the Arendtian account 
of action. It encourages us to look for political action not in occasional, highly organized 
acts, but rather in quotidian, often invisible practices. It reclaims as political the everyday 
activities of marginalized groups. Building toward a theory of poetic agency, Scott adds 
to the Arendtian conditions of political action the admonition to look for such action in 
overlooked places. Through dialectic with Arendt, Scott brings to the fore tenets and 
10 This is not to say that all fanTIs of political action can be exercised unintentionally. For example, power, 
which is actualized when ind ividuals exercise action collectively, constructively. and non-coercively, 
would seem very difficult to actualize without intention. 
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ten ions which went previously unaddressed. Intention is not necessarily involved in 
political action, though it must exist on some level in the case of resistance. In political 
action, as in resistance, when intentions are present they need not be enlightened-
intentions can be both self-interested and resistant. The consequences of acts matter little 
for either political action or resistance. Where political action and resistance diverge is on 
the issue of intention and on the necessarily subversive character of resistance. While the 
concept of resistance provide us with an interesting analytic tool, it is the category of the 
everyday that makes the main contribution to our account of poetic agency. Having added 
an everyday character to Arendtian action, a theory of poetic agency can begin to grapple 
with the politics of the yogun seller, the graffiti anist. or the checkpoint negotiator. But 
before poetic agency can do its full mea ure of explanatory work, consideration of yet 
another theoretical system is necessary. 
Political action is characterized by creative, symbolic acts which assert the unique 
identities of human actors. This Arendtian account of action, brought into encounter with 
Scott, locates political actions, in the main, not in organized, occasional, and 
recognizably political events, but rather in everyday, often invisible acts. This 
synthesized theory of action gives particular attention to the quotidian activities of 
marginalized groups-peasants, workers, youth, and so Forth. Following Arendt, though 
relatively powerless. the members of such groups remain political agents, for they retain 
the power to creatively assen their distinclne through the making of meaning in vinue 
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of their participation in plurality. Developed thus far, this account of poetic agency 
carries considerable explanatory power for interpreting practices such as those presented 
in this paper's second part. However, in certain lengths, the strokes sketched above 
remain overly broad. Compared to Scott's examples of material resistance, in which the 
efficacy of the acts is immediately perceptible, actions which are primarily symbolic are 
more ambiguous in their causalities, deployments, mechanisms, and modes of impact. 
How do actors access and craft spaces of meaning? What are the characteristics of 
symbolic space? What are the avenues through which newly made meaning slides into 
preexisting webs and networks? What are the relations between the symbolic and the 
material and what makes this nexus political? The work of Michel Foucault goes some 
way toward answering these questions. Through his theories of discourse and power, 
Foucault maps the characteristics of the symbolic world and demonstrates its relevance as 
a political space. 
In Foucault, the symbolic world can be understood in terms of discourse and 
power. Discourse refers both to the systems of meaning which exist within, are created 
by, and influence human experience and to the practices and rules which regulate the 
formation and emergence of these systems of meaning. Discourse, Foucault writes, can 
be treated "sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an 
individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts 
for a certain number of statements" (1972a: 80). As the general domain of all statements, 
discourse refers to the totality of propositions expressed as statements by human actors. 
More important for Foucault are the latter two usages of discourse. As an individualizable 
group of statements, discourse refers to systems of meaning which have formed around 
33 
particular categories, persons, institutions, events, and so forth: for example, discourses 
surrounding science, sexuality, disease, age, race, gender, class, and the like. These 
groupings of discourse, what Foucault calls "discursive formations," inscribe symbolic 
characteristics onto phenomena which do not necessarily inhere in the phenomena 
themselves. There is nothing about youth, for instance, which dictates association with 
threat, incompetence, and helplessness. While Foucault would not deny a certain material 
condition of youth, that it possesses a certain ontology independent of inscription and 
interpretation, he would insist that the systems of meaning which circulate around youth 
are only discursive formations-contingent , symbolic creations of human origin. The 
third usage of discourse, referring to "a regulated practice that accounts for a certain 
number of statements," references, in short, the rules and practices which govern the 
emergence and suppression of statements and their admission into or exclusion from 
discursive formations. Discourse as regulation determines the content of statements and 
their systems of relation: the ways in which certain forces, actors, and procedures anempt 
to create, to refashion, and to project meanings; the positions of statements within 
hierarchies of "truth" and "scientificity"; the contests wherein statements are inscribed 
onto certain individuals and institutions. In sum, di scourse, as discursive formations, 
influences how individuals interact with and perceive the world, its objects, themselves, 
and others. And discourse, as that which regulates discursive formations, governs the 
shapes and specific characters these influences assume. Through this Foucauldian 
account of discourse, properties of the symbolic world begin to emerge. Most important 
here are its connections to power, politics, and political action. 
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For Foucault, di scourse is inextricably bound up with power. And power, like 
discourse, is a ubject with which Foucault is deeply concerned . In much if hi s early and 
middle work, Foucault is occupied primarily with tracing the evolutions of power: from 
sovereign power, which is exercised violently from above, to disciplinary power, which 
is enforced through the panoptic gaze, to pastoral power, in which individuals are made 
to police themselves, such as in the Christian practice of confession ( 1977; 1982). For 
Foucault, power is everywhere, functioning in the " form of a chain" and exercised 
"through a net-like organization" (1972b: 98). Power is interpersonal: "in human 
relations, whatever they are .. . power is always present" ( 1984: II ). Importantly, power is 
not only repressive, but also productive ( 1972b). Power is not necessarily a negati ve 
force. Often it is desirable, e.g., in a romantic relationship (1984). It is used not only for 
control , but also for liberati on and resistance: 
One must observe also that there cannot be relations of power unless the 
subjects are free. If one or the other were completely at the disposition of 
the other and became hi s thing, an object on which he can exercise an 
infinite and unlimited violence, there would not be relations of power. In 
order to exercise a relation of power, there must be on both sides at least a 
certain form of liberty . . .. That means that in relat ions of power, there is 
necessarily the possibili ty of resistance, for if there were no possi bili ty of 
resistance-of violent resistance, of escape, of ruse, of strategies that 
reverse the situation- there would be no relations of power. ( 1984: 12) 
Even in the most asymmetrical power distribution, what Foucault calls "domination," the 
relational character of power guarantees the possibility of resistance. Thi s itself- the 
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relational character of power, its necessary inherence in both the repressors and the 
repressed- goes some way toward explaining the political agency of marginalized groups 
such as peasants and youth. Foucault, however, can offer greater explanation still , namely 
through the aforementioned connection he makes between power and discourse. 
Discourse always exists in relation to power. Sets of statements, i.e., discursive 
fonllations, take on degrees of legitimacy, circulation, popularity, recognition, truth , and 
so forth , as mediated by their relations to institutions and networks of power. The 
scientific establishment, for instance, is able to bestow greater and lesser degrees of 
scientificity onto statements, influencing how they will be received and circulated by 
large numbers of people (I 972b). The nexus of power and discourse is always political , 
for discourse impacts how individuals perceive and operate within the world. Here, 
Foucault 's most sustained example addresses discourses of madness, discourses which he 
reveals to be historically contingent and tied to power (1972b). As an object of discourse, 
madness in the West came to be associated with pathology and danger to society. 
Consequently, the mad were confined to asylums. In this case, the manipulation of 
discourse by the scientific and medical establishments- acting as what Foucault calls 
"authorities of delimitation" - had material, harmful effects for a social group. It is in this 
way that discourse, and meaning generally, is always political. Manipulations of the 
symbolic world invariably impact distributions of mental and material wellbeing: " In the 
end, we are judged, condemned, classified, determined in undertakings, destined 10 a 
certain mode of living or dying, as a function of the true discourses which are the bearers 
of the specific effects of power" (1972b: 94). Here, then, in the connections between 
discourse, power, and the individual, emerges an explanation of the efficacy of symbolic 
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political action. Indi viduals, who always exist within relations of power, who, 
consequentl y, are always able to resist, can, incrementally, reshape discourses and 
thereby material realities, accessing the symbolic world through the power of which 
discourse and they themselves are constituted. By reshaping di scourses of themselves and 
their social groups, members of margi nalized groups can influence how they are 
perceived and what they receive. This trajectory, then, offers an explanation for why 
Arendtian political action is political, for it demonstrates avenues by which actors can 
impact politics through creative, symbolic, and revelatory acts. Moreover, Foucault 's 
account, by associating power with both discourse and individuals, explains how it is 
actors can access and manipulate the symbolic world, namely, through the channels of 
power in which both meaning and actor ex ist. 
This reading of Foucault must be defended against a cenain interpretation of his 
work . Especially in consideration of his early writings, it is often alleged that Foucault 's 
system all ows little room for ind ividual agency. Discourse, critics al lege, is a total izing 
force which constitutes the individual entirely. There is no room left for political agency 
to assen itself. After all , Foucault himself argues that individuals never exist outside of 
preexisting relations of power. In shon , agency calmot be reconciled with Foucauldian 
discourse. 
This interpretation of Foucault fa lls short on account of its misunderstanding of 
discourse. As noted above, while Foucault cenainly holds that indi viduals always exist 
within discursive power relations, this does not mean that ind ividuals are depri ved of 
meaningful political agency. The power relations in which individuals are enmeshed can 
be harnessed by political agents, bent toward their own ambitions and ends: " there can be 
37 
no relations of power unless the subjects are free" (1984: 12). Foucault clearly objects to 
the notion of the "transcendental subject" (I 972a; I 972b), i.e., a subject able to fonn and 
exert his or her will totally independent of all discursive influences. However, locating 
the subject within a discursive field does not deprive him or her of political agency; it 
merely asserts that his or her political agency will be colored by the di scourses circulating 
within a particular space and time. Beyond its mere coloring of agency, it might be 
claimed that the discursive field, by being the context in which individuals operate, is in 
fact that which makes agency possible. In a sense, this claim would seem to be not too far 
from that advanced by Arendt, namely, that it is because of the condition of plurality that 
human beings can exercise action. Discourse. similarly, should not be understood as 
something which prevents the emergence of human agency, but rather as something 
which makes the emergence of human agency possible. Discursive fields color the 
particular characteristics certain agencies will assume, but they do not totalize individuals 
in their entirety. Rather, discursive fields provide the mediums of operation necessary for 
political action. Foucault's accommodation of political agency, then, is in fact 
demonstrated through his theory of discourse. 
A second argument for Foucauldian agency is particularly relevant to the account 
of poetic agency being developed here. This second argument arises from Foucault's 
writing on what he calls an "ethic of care for the self' (1984). For Foucault, individual 
ethics in classical Greece and Rome was characterized by concern for bettering the self. 
This ethic of caring for the self contrasts to later Christian ethics in which the individual 
is no longer concerned foremost with constructing, through his or her own understanding 
and preferences, an admirable self, but rather with adhering to an imposed ystem of 
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Christian doctrine. Caring for the self is characterized by introspection and by mastering 
and improving one's mind, body, desires. and reputation. Unlike Christian ethics, in 
which the individual aligns dogmatically with a standard which is not of his or her own 
design, the ethic of care for the self is interrogative of circulating discourses and it resists 
impositions of meaning. In Socratic character, care for self improves the self through 
understanding and inspection. It renounces those systems of meaning with which it finds 
fault . The care for the self can be taken as an explici t example of Foucauldian agency. A 
such, it illustrates the argument given above, namely that Foucauldian agency is always 
colored by discursive fields, but never totalized by them: 
I would say that if now I am interested, in fact, in the way in which the 
subject constitutes himself in an active fashion, by the practices of self, 
these practices are nevertheless not something that the individual invents 
by himself. They are patterns that he finds in his culture and which are 
proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his culture, his society, and 
his social group. ( 1984: II) 
Here, we have a specific case of how, in the exercise of agency, the discursive field 
asserts its innuence. The practices of the self, though practices through which individuals 
exercise their agency, are nonetheless practices shaped by discourses circulating within a 
given context. Characterized by links to power which simultaneously limit it and allow its 
actualization, the ethic of care for the self demonstrates the possibilities and 
characteristics of Foucauldian agency. A specific case of Foucauldian agency, the care 
for the self also fits with an Arendtian account of action. Through the assertion of 
individual understanding, the care for the self is an assertion of one's uniqueness, of 
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Arendtian distinctness; as an artistic practice ofself-creation, the care for the selfis an 
exercise of natality; and because the self which is cared for is projected symbolically in 
deed and action, because this projection itself is something which is cared for, the care 
for the selfi s, finally, a symbolic process. What the account of care for the self adds to 
the Arendtian account of action is a specific possibility for its emergence. Just as Scott's 
everyday resistance demon trates how Arendtian action can be exercised daily, 
Foucault 's ethic of care for the self reveals how Arendtian action, through its exercise, 
might not only disclose the identity of an agent, but also participate in the constitution of 
the disclosed identity. In other words, Foucault demonstrates that political action not only 
has the ability to reveal the self, but also to construct, deconstruct, and rebuild it. 
Added to Arendt and Scott, Foucault 's theories of power and di scourse map out the 
specific microphysics through which poetic agency can be exercised. Foucault details the 
character of the symbolic world and accounts for how its manipulation is fundamentally a 
political process. Foucault encourages us to critically interrogate the systems of meaning 
surrounding marginalized groups, for discourses of youth. the peasantry, and so fonh will 
be tied to power just like discourse of madness. Through his relational account of power. 
Foucault explains the possibilities for resistance in even the most asymmetrical power 
relations. Power can only be exercised in relation to a free subject, and in this way 
relations of domination are never totalizing. The systems of meaning which actors can 
access and manipulate through poetic agency can have grave material impacts on their 
welfare. 0 it is that poetic agency can become a form of resistance: members of 
marginalized groups can manipulate discourses of their social groups, thereby altering the 
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symbolic and material distributions which contribute to their marginalization. Through 
practicing the care for the self, members of marginalized groups can also create new 
realities. carrying out an aesthetics of sel f-invention that resists the imposition of identity 
and meaning. The account of the care for the self contributes to the theory of poetic 
agency in that it identifies one of the most common fonns poetic agency wi ll assume. 
Practicing care for the self necessaril y in volves the actualization of natality, the 
manipulation of meaning, and the disclosure of the "who." Always a case of Arendtian 
action, the care for the self is also almost always a case of resistance. Having mapped the 
nature of the symbolic, having identified its ties to power and the individual , and having 
characterized a specific emergence of Arendtian action, the addition of Foucault to 
Arendt and COt1 allows a powerful theory of poetic agency to emerge. 
Poetic agency is characterized by three necessary conditions: the actualization of natality, 
the transmission of meaning, and the disclosure of the ·'who." Poetic agency takes these 
necessary conditions from Arendt. Poetic agency is also characterized by three particular 
manifestations: Arendtian power (involving both practices of community and 
remembrance), everyday acts, and the care for the self. This latter set of three describes 
particular forms it will be common for poetic agency to assume. In building a theory of 
poetic agency, we have encountered a certain number of tensions. We will look for these 
when we suspect poetic agency to be present. We will look, for example, for the mixture 
of self-interested and resistant intentions in the consciousness of the poetic agent. When 
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we suspect the presence of care for the self, we will attempt to detect the presence of 
imposed identities and controlling discourses. As we locate poetic action and poetic 
agents, we will ask what it is about prevailing systems of meaning which have forced this 
particular recours what it is within the symbolic distribution against which the poetic 
agent struggles. We will ask these questions, look for these tensions, and test the 
explanatory power of thi s theory in the ca e of Israe li and Palesti nian youth. 
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S"mi"istim and Dheisheh Camp: Case Studies of Israeli and Palestinian 
Youth 
In this second part of the paper, the theory of poeti c agency wi ll be put to work in attempt 
to interpret two case studies involving Israeli and Palestinian youth. The fi rst case study 
concerns "lIIinis1illl, Israeli youth who, graduating high school, refuse mandatory service 
in the Israeli Defense Forces. The second case concerns the practices of Palestinian youth 
livi ng in Bethlehem ' s Dheisheh refugee camp. The activities of these youth include 
creating works of visual art , performing theatre, bui lding social networks on Facebook, 
tell ing slories, and writing and recording rap music. It was, in large part, through 
encounters with S"lIIinislilll and youth in Dheisheh whi le in the fi eld and through 
subsequent attempts to ex plain their practices that my belief in the need for an account of 
poetic agency developed. 
In choosing a mode of presentation for these case studies of poetic agency, I have 
chosen to frame the analyses in tenns of what poetic agency is responding 10. In other 
words, as a way of approaching the poetic agency fo und in S"minislim and Dheisheh 
camp, I have organized the respective analyses by first presenting what it is I think 
poetic agency is being exercised against in each particular instance. This method of 
organization achieves two purposes. First, this framing-{)r one similar to it- is 
necessary in order to hope to achieve a mean ingful analysis of the poetic agency in 
question. To take an example di scussed above, it would have been impossible fo r Scott. 
for instance, to meaningfull y assess the everyday resistance he located among Malay ian 
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peasants if he did not ftrSt understand and contextualize the forces the peasantry pursued 
political action in relation to, namely, the land owners. In the same way, identifying the 
poetic agency of Israeli and Palestinian youth requires that we understand the relational 
character and context in which that poetic agency obtains. While it is beyond the scope of 
this paper to present a sweeping reading of the dynamics of power in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict/occupation zone, it is possible here to identify certain power 
dynamics to which particular poetic agencies seem to be responding. This, then, is the 
second purpose of the oppositional mode of organization adopted here: to identify a 
particular mode and exercise of poetic agency from among its multifarious manifestations 
in Israel-Palestine. Framing in terms of a particular power relation allows us to 
meaningfully understand a particular poetic agency and it also helps us to pinpoint a 
particular poetic agency for analysis. Granted, it must be kept in mind that by excluding 
many power relations within the context- power relations ranging from occupation, to 
gender, to class, and so forth- the analysis will necessarily overlook important processes 
and interactions. However, given the scope of this paper, it is this path which must be 
adopted in order to avoid an analysis hopelessly broad and shallow. 
For comparative purposes, I have focused in both case studies on what I take to be 
a similar power relation: the exercise of poetic agency by youth against imposed and 
controlling discourses of youth. I begin each case study by identifying dominant 
discourses of youth circulating within the given spacial and symbolic context. I then 
proceed to analyze the particular poetic agencies which have emerged among Israeli and 
Palestinian youth, respectively, as poetic agencies to reject and remake these discourses 
of youth. The focus of both case studies on this particular set of power relations- poetic 
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agency against dominant discourses of youth- is particularly relevant as a point of 
application for the previous theoretical dialectic because thi s particular set of power 
relations involves a poetic agency which demonstrates all three of the "particuJar 
manifestations" articulated earlier: the actualization of Arendtian power, an everyday 
nature, and the practice of care for the self. While the three necessary conditions of poetic 
agency- the actualization of natality, symbolic transmission, and the disclosure of the 
"who"- must obviously always be present in its realization, the case studies selected here 
are particular insightful in that they not only involve the demonstration of these necessary 
conditions being met, but they also offer evidence and particular examples of the more 
"optional" or "occasional" characteristics of poetic agency being exercised. 
This second section of the paper is in four parts. First, I begin with a brief word 
on method not included in the introductory pages. Second, J offer a short introduction to 
the opposite pole of the power relat ion in question: discourses of youth. Third, J present 
the case study of the Shminislim, analyzing their exercise of poetic agency against 
militarized discourses of youth. Finally, I give the case study of Dheisheh camp, detailing 
the deployment of poetic agency by its youth against discourses of youth often violent 
and mythologized. 
The methodology of this paper is a reflection of its theoretical commitments. As it is 
concerned with the poetic agency of a marginalized group, and as it is particularly 
concerned with contextually situated and dynamic systems of meaning, the paper deploys 
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a type of political ethnography (Schatz 2009a) which influenced data collection 
(participant observation, immersion, in-depth interviews) and, more broadly. operates 
throughout the paper through an "ethnographic sensibility;' i.e., an effort to put at the 
fore the " the meanings that the people under study attribute to their social and political 
reality" ( chatz 2009b: 5; Wedeen 2009). An ethnographic sensibility aligns with the 
paper' s normative and theoretical commitments in that all give deference to the lived 
experiences of subjects as they narrate and perform them. Beyond "normative 
grounding," an ethnographic method offers "detailed evidence," "theoretical vibrancy," 
and "the promise of epistemological innovation" to the researcher (Schatz 2009b: II). It 
is a method particularly well suited for this paper, because ethnography helps u to re-
conceptualize the political (Schatz 2009b: 10), to locate power in overlooked places 
(Kubik 2009: 36; ), and to interrogate constructed realities such as discourse (Kubik 
2009: 46; Wedeen 2009). As I both locate power and connect power to meaning, I deploy 
both " positivist" and "interpretive" ethnography (Kubik 2009: 49). Finally, the 
ethnography used here is also "postmodem" in that it is multi-sited and is suspicious of 
the "authorial authority of the interpreter" (Kubik 2009: 43). Respecting the latter 
sensibility, the paper presents at length primary texts. 
The paper draws upon field work conducted in Israel and the OPT during the 
summer of20 I O. Methods of data collection included participant observation and in-
depth interviews. I participated in seminars and focus groups located at Israeli and 
Palestinian universities and non-governmental organizations. All youth interviewed 
identified as eighteen years of age or older. All names have been substituted . I surveyed 
public spaces and artwork throughout Israel and the West Bank, especially Palestinian 
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graffiti found in refugee camps and on the Israeli Separation Wall. Interviews were 
conducted in English, solicited through a "snowball method," and most often occurred at 
hubs of youth activity- universities, refugee canlps, theatres, organizational 
headquarters, and the like. I observed multiple protests involving Palestinian youth. 
Before and after the period of field research, I surveyed online music videos, web sites, 
and interviews produced by or involving Israeli and Palestinian youth. Additionally, I 
surveyed the literature on the subject of study. 
This paper is not primarily concerned with conceptualizing youth as a rigid age-based 
category. While age ought to be taken into account in questions of youth, it is much more 
in the theoretical spirit of this paper to consider youth, in the main, as a di scursively 
constituted category created by interplays of power including power dynamics emerging 
from youth themselves. While the youth interviewed in the case studies all qualify as 
such by universalist age-based definitions, the Israeli and Palestinian youth with which 
this paper is concerned might not always do so. However, I believe there are good 
reasons for considering these individuals youth nonetheless. In the Palestinian case, for 
instance, it is often said to researchers that Palestinian schoolchildren are "not like 
children elsewhere" or "not like children in America." What has been identified as a 
"culture of resistance" is said to pervade Palestinian space, leading, among other things, 
to the early maturation of children. In large part, this image of the Palestinian child as a 
precocious political resister has arisen through remembrance and myth making of the 
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stone-throwing child confronting the Israeli Defense Forces in the intifada. On the other 
end of the age spectrum, Palestinians in their middle and late twenties have their own 
case to make for consideration as youth, namely through their participation in 
"wai thood"- a concept which has been used to describe the life situations of young 
people throughout the Middle East, including those living in Palestinian space (Yousef 
2009). An individual in waithood is characterized by being educated, unemployed, 
unmarried, unable to access credit, and unable to relocate. This condition is prevalent for 
young Arab men from adolescence into the thirties. Despite their age, the older among 
thi s group, it might be argued, still merit classification as youth given the relative 
economic and political marginalization they share with the acknowledged members of 
that category. Through examples such as this, the culturally constructed nature of youth 
emerges. This paper will conceptualize youth in thi s way: as a contested symbolic 
category. 
"Youth" must be understood as a discourse, more accurately as a multiplicity of dynamic 
discourses that shift across time and space, that are subject to unceasing construction and 
deconstruction, and that are the sites of politicized contests among infinite power 
relations. I I That di scourses of youth are ontologically so has been glimpsed by analysts, 
particularly in discussions of what is referred to as "the manipulation of the labels ' child' 
and youth'" (Schwartz ?O I 0: 6). McEvoy-Levy, for example, notes the tendency "to 
equate children with victimization and youth ... with perpetration" (2006: 4). This reflects, 
she argues, "assumptions about what is acceptable or unacceptable for 'our ' children and 
' their' children, assumptions that may be tied to foreign policy interests or gender 
11 This paragraph taken from an essay \vrinen for PO 490 in fall of201O. 
48 
stereotypes" (2006: 4). Thus, "youth" is not only "socially constructed" and ·'h istorically 
variable," but also "highly contestable" (2006: 3). A salient example of the "manipulation 
of labels" occurs in the context of child soldiering. Whether child soldiers are to be 
"victims," " perpetrators," or something in between is often a function of political 
interests (Lee 2009). Analyses of "manipulation" uch as these are beginning to grasp the 
contested nature of youth as sketched above. However, theoretical work 
remains in moving beyond "manipulation" as an aberrant and occasional phenomenon 
that occurs in a descending power dynamic as elites "manipulate" "labels" in their 
interests. The struggle for discourses of youth must be recognized as omnipresent, always 
ongoing, occurring not only from the "top-down" but also from the "bottom-up." 
involving complex webs of meaningmaking that make even a double vector seem 
hopelessly obsolete. 
The formation of discourses of youth is fundamenta lly a political process, for how 
youth are perceived and how youth perceive themselves affect how youth act, how youth 
are acted upon, and what youth receive. Criminalized discourses of youth might call for 
policing, surveillance, and incarceration, while victimized discourses of youth might lead 
to foreign aid or military intervention. Discourses of youth can also be adopted by youth 
themselves, thereby influencing not only how youth are treated, but also how youth 
choose to treat themselves and to treat others. Discourses of youth are political because 
they are tied up with processes of social control , with the forms of political action youth 
undertake, and with the distribution of resources and punishments youth receive. 
ymbolic politics cannot be separated from fonna l politics. "Politics is not merely about 
material interests but also about contests over the symbolic world, over the management 
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and appropriation of meanings" (Wedeen 1999: 31). Discourses of youth are sites of 
symbolic contests, si tes in which youth themselves have a say through the exercise of 
poetic agency. 
Before presenting the case studies, a qualification is necessary on the language 
" Israeli and Palestinian youth." This wording is often used here as a shorthand for 
"certain Israeli and Palestinian youth who are involved with the kinds of political actions 
with which I am concerned ." When I speak of Israeli and Palestinian youth as poetic 
agents, I am, of course, referring to an agency which all Israeli and Palestinian youth 
have the potential to exercise. However, it is obviously not the case that all Israeli and 
Palestinian youth are primarily concerned with exercising this agency. Some, for 
instance, deploy acts of violence and terror- acts which, though symbolic, have difficulty 
meeting other criteria of poetic agency. In short , rather than repeatedly add the 
qualification that I am speaking about only a particular subset of Israeli and Palestinian 
youth, I have adopted lhe shorthand described here. Similarly, when, in the second case 
study, I speak of the "youth living in Dheisheh" or "youth in Dheisheh," I am employing 
a related shorthand: "youth in Dheisheh" should be read as something like "a certain 
number of youth living in Dheisheh camp who engage in the political action being 
discussed at presen!." Additionally, although many youth living in Dheisheh engage in a 
certain number of common and collective practices, I do not mean to suggest that all 
youth in Dheisheh are well characterized as poetic agents. 
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The dominant discourse of youth in Israel is youth as so ldier. Although thi s discourse, 
like all di scourses, is tied up with power and subject to change, the Israeli youth with 
\ hom I spoke repeatedly emphasized the dominance of the soldier discourse. While 
many Israeli youth embrace the di scourse of youth as soldier, certain others have elected 
to reject and remake it. Among the most prominent of the laner have been the 
hlllinislilll , Israeli youth who, in thei r final year of high school, have refused to 
participate in mandatory military service upon graduation. Through their refusal to 
participate in military service, and through their proposal of alternative measures youth 
might undertake to serve society, hlllinislilll , I argue, exercise a poetic agency which 
remakes the discourse of youth as solider. I begin this case study by tracing the character 
of this discourse through presentation of research data and citation of secondary 
literature. I then turn to the example of Shlllinisl i lll , locating the exercise of poetic agency 
within its political action. 
avah is a student and youth activist at Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Formerly an 
artillery instructor in the Israeli Defense Forces. she now helps to lead service learning 
classes at the university. As someone who interacts with Israeli youth daily, Navah, 
herself a youth, had this to say about the place of youth in Israeli society: 
How are youth perceived in Israel? Being a soldier, that 's the first thing. 
Adults see young people as so ldi ers .... The military has a bigger role in 
socialization than the school. You go through very intense brain training. 
They need for youth to have a discourse of the other as an enemy. When 
you are very young you see it as black and white. You are young and can 
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be taken advantage of. You can be manipulated ... . It 's not a conspiracy, 
no smoky room. They are not going to take high school students to see the 
wall . It's part of the sociali zation process. People need to think we are 
right. If people here start to question Zionism and Israel, then everything 
falls apart. It 's not sustainable. 
For Navah, the dominant discourse of youth in Israel is youth as soldier. She notes that 
thi s is especially how adults see youth, and suggests in the process that youth might not 
see themselves in quite the same way. However, how youth see themselves, Navah notes, 
cannot be separated from a process of "brai n training" which youth undergo in 
preparation for military service. She says that youth are socialized to "have a di scourse of 
the other as an enemy," the unspoken corollary being that the purpose of military training 
is to prepare youth to defend society from that enemy. It is an enemy logic that 
symboli zes youth as soldiers. The discourse, then, is "not a conspiracy," but rather a 
discourse that emerges from deeply situated ways of thinking about the other, the state, 
and the relations between the two. 
In another narrative, Dafne, a young human rights activist, identifies processes 
propelling Israeli youth to embrace military service and to avoid political activism: 
There are teachers in the school and there are soldiers in the school. You 
are a part of it, and it 's hard to differentiate. You can go and talk to both of 
them . ... The army, the way people treat it in high school, it' s not different 
from the way you [Americans) treat college. When you' re sixteen, you 
start to prepare for the SAT. Here, when we' re in high school, we prepare 
for the army- what unit we' ll try to be in, where we' ll serve, whatever. . .. 
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Politically active youth are a tiny minority. One of the reasons is military 
service. Military service is so mainstream, so it's like, if you ' re a political 
activist, it 's like you're endangering Israel. You know, people think "the 
military is on the border to protect you," so if you're against the military, 
you want my family to die. There is not much nuance to this thinking. So 
even if you' re not agai nst the military, just against occupation, or policies 
A. B, C, people don ' t see that nuanced version. You're just against the 
military. This has a lot to do with propaganda on the left. When you hear 
ISM [International Solidarity Movement] and people all around the world 
talking about how Israel is the worst army ever, people conJlate that 
radical rhetoric with nuanced positions against the military. 
Al so, there is still a mentality of siege, you know, how Jews didn ' t have 
any other place to go. Anti- emitism is promoted all over the place. The 
Holocaust is all over the history books. All you remember from school is 
the Holocaust. If I'm not mistaken, the history curriculum is divided into 
like ten sections. and two of those sections are on anti-Semitism. Then you 
have Holocaust memorial day every year. You have to celebrate in every 
way. But my grandfather was in Auschwitz. 0 it is very personal. . .. 
In the 11th grade YOll have the trip to Poland. They call it a "roots trip." I 
don ' t even know how many of the families were actually ever from 
Poland. There are Israeli flags everywhere. I mean, it's really 
manipulative. There is also an economic divide, because the school 
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doesn' t pay the entire cost of the trip. You have to pay like one thousand 
dollars and so some don ' t go. But even so, the trip is still felt by everyone. 
I mean, for two week there isn' t any school , and everyone knows about 
the trips, where you are. 
For Dafne, Israeli youth are encouraged to take up the ro le of soldier by a multiplicity of 
pressures. Emotional , nationalisti c, economic, and career motivations move youth to 
embrace military ervice. The impetuses are deepl y rooted in historical events, and they 
continuou Iy excn themselves upon Israeli youth across temporal and physical space. 
Funhennore. there are consequences for youth who repudiate the military. Those who do 
mi ght be seen as "endangering Israel.·' As Dafne noted later, there are also social 
pres ures to serve: " Ifyou're a man and you didn ' t serve. then you' re a faggot." 
Additionally, Israeli youth see military service as an economic issue. A youth who had 
rcfu ed to serve said the following of the afiemlath: 
I couldn' t even find a job as a waitress. The second paragraph on the form 
is always about your army ervice .... If there are two equal employees. 
one who served in the army and one who didn' t. you know the one they' re 
going to pick. 
everalthemes emerge from the narratives of these Israeli youth. First, youth as 
soldier is identified as a dominant discourse of youth. econd, the discourse is understood 
to arise from a complex interplay of hi storical forces . Third, youth as soldier is deepl y 
ingrained into Israeli social space: in chools, homes, the military, social networks, and 
so fonh. Finally, the primacy of the discourse is protected in pan by a system of 
consequences that are met at refusal. 
54 
These points are reOected in contemporary scholarship. Militarism has been 
recognized as a pervasive fo rce in Israeli society (Kimmerling 200 I; Lomsky-Feder and 
Ben-Ari 1999). ot merely a mode periodically adopted, militarism is intricately 
intertwined with the Israeli social fabric, manifesting itself in schools, parades, 
performances, voyages to Poland, public rituals, memorials, museums, holidays, 
preparation for military servi ce, military service itself, reserve duty, social networks, 
employment, social status, marriage, and politics (Adelman 2003; Feldman 2008; Golan 
1997; Hazan 200 I; Helman 1999; Kimmerling 200 I; Lomsky-Feder and Ben-Ari 1999; 
Maman et a!. 2001; Mazali 2003; Sered 2000). Youth are connected to all of these 
spheres. In many of them, youth are the primary participants. Israeli youth are submerged 
in what I(jmmerling identifies as a "militarism of the mind·' or a "total militarism" (200 I: 
214-2 15). As the narratives above note, it is not a conspiracy, but rather a function of 
histori cal processes and their contemporary representations (Ben-Eliezer 1998; Shapira 
1992). Among these lie the origins of the discourse of youth as soldier. 
The contemporary discourse carries certain nuances. First, it is more accurate to 
speak of a defender discourse than a soldier discourse. As implied in the narratives above, 
the overarching duty of youth is to defend the state materially and ideologically through a 
diversity of practices. Soldiering is merely the most alient manifestation of this duty. 
Gendering the analysis, for example, we find that the role of young women is not so 
much to defend the state by soldi ering, but rather to defend the state by defending oneself 
and by allowing oneself to be defended by men (Adelman 2003; Golan 1997; Izraeli 
2001; Lomsky-Feder and Ben-Ari 2007: Mazali 2003; Sered 2000). Young women are 
dissuaded from serving in combat positions. Their period of service is shorter, and they 
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are more ea ily exempted from service altogether. Even in the military. they are 
constructed as "helpless victims" and "vulnerable bodies" (Sered 2000: 88). Above all. 
young female soldiers must not be raped by the enemy (Sered 2000). They must be 
protected by strong young men, those who combat enemy forces and in the process prove 
their masculinity to their peers (Ben-Ari 200 1). Gendered military experiences suggest 
that a so ldier discourse is too narrow. A defender di scourse better captures the diverse 
experi ences of Israeli youth.'2 It also accommodates the ideological defenses in which 
youth arc expected to participate. 
A second refinement of the discourse is found in what has been identified as a 
move from "obligatory militarism" to "contractual militarism" (Levy et al. 2007). In the 
former, military service is perceived as "an unconditioned, mandatory national duty," 
while in the laller it must be reconci led wi th " the individual's ambitions and interests" 
(Levy et al. 2007: 127). It is argued that certain forces- market liberalization and post-
Zionism- have created a new relationship between the military and Israeli youth (Levy 
2003 ; Levy et al. 2007; Peri 200 I; Ram 2008; Zemlinskaya 2008). Market liberalization 
has decreased what Levy et al. identify as the "convertibility" of military service, i.e., the 
benefits military service bestows for life in the civilian sector. Historically, military 
service granted Israeli soldiers financial rewards and social prestige which tran lated into 
gains in the civi lian workforce (Levy et al. 2007: 129). However, with the liberalization 
of the Israeli economy, the convertibility of these benefits has declined. Thi decline has 
been especially salient for wealthy Ashkenazi Jews. For this social group, the opportunity 
cost of military service has escalated. Economic opportunities are increasingly global and 
11 In addition to the gendered experiences mentioned here, substantial differences among Israeli youth exist 
along other lines. Especially notable are differences between Ashkenazi youlh and Sephardi youth, between 
secular youth and religious youth, and between Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian/Arab-Israeli youth. 
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dynamic, and so military service is no longer a necessary or even a preferable gateway to 
economic prosperity (Levy et al. 2007). Additionally, the ideology of market 
liberalization has compromised ideological allegiance to military service. Israeli youth 
are increasingly characterized by individualism rather than collectivism, want ing military 
service to "work for them," as it were something it is doing less and less in a globalized 
market economy (Levy et al. 2007). Levy et al. also note that the prestige of military 
service has declined from its historical high. Particularly relevant for this decline was the 
international outrage at Israeli military policy during the first inlifada-policy which was 
perceived as oppressive and unnecessarily brutal. Convertibility, then, has declined not 
only because the economic benefits of military service have lessened, but also because 
the prestige of military service has fallen. Finally, the advent of post-Zionism- an 
out look which, in essence, conceptualizes Israel as a democratic, heterogeneous, and 
market-oriented state rather than a Jewish state has brought into contestation the 
ideological allegiance of Israelis to conscripted service in a highly nationalized military 
(Zemli nskaya 2008). As in the case of market liberalization, post-Zionism ha affected 
primarily wealthy, secular Ashkenazi Israelis. The members of this social group have the 
most to gain fTom market liberalization, and they have the least to lose from post-Zionism 
in terms of ideological and religious investment. The results of these economic and 
ideologica l trends has been the shift to "contractual militarism" Levy et al. identify. 
Military service is increasingly perceived as something which ought to benefit the 
individual (a "contract" with him or her), not merely the collective. Given their economic 
and ideological standing, wealthy, secular Ashkenazi Jews have been the strongest 
proponents of contractual militarism. As a result, it is primarily youth from this social 
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group who make up the ranks of those who refuse to serve in the Israeli Defense Forces 
(lemlinskaya 2008). 
n,e sum of the narratives and scholarship surveyed here is a discourse of Israeli 
youth as a contractual defender. The discourse depiclS youth as mililarized defenders of 
the Slate, though defenders increas ingly se lf-interested and less concemed with their 
dutie to the collective. The mover of the process is a system of evolving economic and 
ideological ~ rces. What i lell out of this picture i the poetic agency of youth 
them elve . 
, "millis/im pro\ ide perhaps the most salient example of poetic agency being exercised 
against the discourse of y uth as contractual defender. "minis/im, a term \ hich 
technically refers to I raeli youth in the final year of high chool (Hebrew for "twelllh 
graders"), has come to de ignate tho e youth wh . at the time of conscription, refu e to 
sen e. In 200 I. they wrote the following leller to Prime Minister Ariel haron: 
\ e, the undersigned, youths \\ ho gre\\ up and were brought up in Israel. 
are about to be ailed to erve in the IDF. We protest before you against 
the aggressive and racist policy pursued by the Israeli goverrunent and it 
army. and to inform you that we do not intend to take part in the exe ution 
of this policy. 
We strongl y resist I rael's pounding of human rights. Land expropriation. 
arrests, executions without a trial , house demolition, closure. tonure. and 
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the prevention of health care arc only some of the crimes the Slate of Israel 
carries out, in blunt violation of international conventions it has ratified. 
The e actions are not only illegitimate; they do not even achieve their 
slated goal- increasing the ci tizens' personal safety. Such safety will be 
achieved onl y through ajust peace agreement between the Israeli 
government and the Palestinian people. 
Therefore we will obey our conscience and refuse to take part in acts of 
oppression against the people, acts that should properly be 
called terrorist actions. We call upon persons our age. conscripts, soldiers 
in the standing army, and reserve ervice soldiers to do the same. 
A second ICller, writlen in 2009, will also be useful to consider: 
We are all community activists and contribute in various ways to a variety 
of sectors in the Israeli society. We believe that contribution, cooperation 
and volunteeri m are a way of life, and should not be limited to just two or 
three years. Our conscientious objection terns directly from our volunteer 
experience, from the values we believe in. from our love of the ociety 
that we are a part of and in which we live. from our respect of every 
human being, and fTom the aim of making our country a betler place for 
all of its inhabitants .... 
The claim put forth by the spokespersons of the government and the army. 
that the continuation of the occupation arises from security reasons. has no 
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substance. 0 country that has fought for its independence has ever been 
defeated by military means. The suffering of the Palestinian people and 
their subjugation is the cause of violent resistance. Israel's public will 
never be safe as long as the Palestinian nation is under occupation. There 
is no military so lution to the Israe li-Palestinian conflicHlIlly peace will 
ensure life and security for Jews and Arabs in this country .. . . 
In Israeli society it is a matter of fact that at 18, every young man and 
woman panakes in military service. However, we cannot ignore the truth-
the occupation is an extreme situation, violent, racist, inhuman, illegal, 
non democratic, and immoral , that is life threatening for both nations. We 
that have been brought up on values of liberty, justice, righteousness, and 
peace cannot accept it. 
Our objection to becoming soldiers of the occupation stems from our 
loyalty to our values and to the society surrounding us, and it is pan of our 
ongoing struggle for peace and equality, a struggle whose Jewish-Arab 
nature proves that peace and co-existence is possible. This is our way, and 
'11' h' 13 we are Wl mg to pay t e price. 
In writing these letter, the youth of S/IIIJinislim exercise poetic agency. Through the acts 
of composition and dissemination, Shminislim fulfill all three of the conditions necessary 
for poetic action. And through their initial acts of refusal, through the acts of 
introspection which preceded their refusals, and through the subsequent act of coming 
IJ Shminislim letters available at hnp:lldecemberI8th,org! (20 II). 
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together as a group to write these letters, Shlllinislilll exercise everyday action, actualize 
Arendtian power, and practice care for the sel f. 
The actualization of natality is characterized by creation. Natality is actualized 
when one creates a new reality or reshapes an old reality in a new way through the 
assertion of one's distinctness. Among the many realities created by the composition and 
dissemination of the letters above is the reality of new and reshaped discourses of youth. 
The letters cited here actualize natality in virtue of their recreation of the discourse of 
youth as contractual defender. Moreover, a new discourse of youth is created---i)ne in 
which youth support society in ways not assigned to them by dominant discourse. 
Natality is actualized here as S"lIIillislim create and recreate discourse in at least three 
ways. First. the SIIlIIinislilll remake the notion of defense. For these youth, defense of 
society is best achieved by resisting militarism physically and ideologically. This is 
diametric to the meaning of defense under the prevailing discourse. The SIImil1islilll hold 
that Israel's military campaign (its "pounding of human rights") does not increase the 
safety of Israeli citizens. Consequently, youth who would defend lsrael should refuse to 
serve in its military. Second. the SIIlIIil1islilll cite moral concerns as motivation. In 
opposition to the market-oriented and self-interested contractual defender, these youth 
claim to be following their "conscience." The language they deploy (e.g., "racist" and 
' )usl") suggests the presence of ethical concerns unaccounted for in the dominant 
discourse. Finally, these youth display a commitment to an expanded collective. It is not 
simply that the "lIIinislilll endorse collectivism agai nst the individualism of the 
contractual defender. Rather, they embrace a collectivism more collective than that which 
they are supposed to have abandoned. For these Israel i youth, the collective is not only 
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composed of Israelis, but also Palestinians. Concern for the enemy is not a characteristic 
assigned to youth within the discourse of youth as contractual defender. By remaking 
discourses involving defense, motivation, and collectivism, Shministim ultimately 
recreate di scourses of youth and thereby actuali ze natali ty. 
The creation which characterizes natality arises out of the assertion of 
di stinctness. Thus, the actualization of natality is always bound up with the di sclosure of 
the "who"- a linkage which remains close knit in thi s case. The disclosure of the "who" 
is a revelatory act, often unconscious. in which the actor shows hi s or her unique identity 
to others. What is interesting about this particular instance of disclosure is that the 
hmillistim seem very conscious of the distinct identities they are disclosing- likely, I 
would venture, due to the sharp contrast between their revelations and the discourse of 
youth as contractual defender. Two levels of distinct identity are at work in this instance 
of di sclosure. The first is the distinctness of each individual Shministim . The second is the 
distinctness of the collective identitY- "our conscience"- from the identity of youth 
presented in the discourse of youth as contractual defender. '"All community activists." 
the Shmillistilll are explicit in their disclosure of those unique aspects of their identity 
which set them apan: "Our conscientious objection stems directly from our volunteer 
experience, from the values we believe in, from our love of the society that we are a pan 
of and in which we live, from our respect of every human being, and from the aim of 
making our country a better place for all of its inhabitants." The unique identities 
Shlllinistilll disclose involve association with volunteerism, love of society, and respect 
for human beings. The distinctness which is disclosed is not necessarily absent fTom the 
identities of others, but the Shlllinistilll have chosen to give it precedence in their 
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individual cases. In identifying themselves as "we that have been brought up on values of 
liberty, justice, righteousness, and peace:' they suggest that which makes them distinct 
from others is not something totally absent fTom the identities of others- rather, the 
hminis/im, like other Israelis, were brought up with certain values, yet the Shminis/im 
have set themselves apart by choosing to uphold those values rather than neglect them, or 
at least by choosing to interpret the meanings of those values differently. By identifying 
themselves openly as adherents to a distinct value system, the Shminislim disclose the 
"who.!! 
The final necessary condition for the exercise of poetic agency- symbolic 
transmission- is clearly fulfilled in this case. In the initial act of refusal, in the 
dissemination of letters, in interviews with the public, in the endurance of prison 
sentences, discriminations, and public humiliations, the Shminis/im communicate 
explicitly their intentions to others. 
An interesting feature of this instance of poetic agency is its realization of all 
three of the "particular manifestations" theorized earlier. The Shminis/im's refusal is an 
everyday act. It is not an everyday act because the dec/ara/ioll oj reJusal is a quotidian 
occurrence, but rather because Shminis/im' s refusal involves a sequence of quotidian acts 
which continue long after the period of initial declaration. Following the first act of 
refusal, Shminis/im adopt new strategies of negotiation and survival. Economically, 
politically, and socially marginalized, Shminis/im continue to make meanings dai ly as 
they interact with and confront families and friend, as they struggle to find employment, 
as they ball Ie in court, as they search for acceptance, and as they share their stories with 
those they encounter. In this way, Shmillis/im exercise an everyday agency that continues 
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to challcnge meanings of youth, defense, and the state long after the initial declaration of 
refusal has passed. Arendtian power is actualized when individuals collectively engage in 
creative, non-coercive action. This, it " ould seem, is exactly what Shminislim are doing. 
As discussed above, their acts are inherently creative, making and remaking discourses of 
youth . Their action is the antithesis of coercion- it is coercion they have united against, 
i.e., the coercion to serve in the military despite their convictions. The collective nature of 
their action is evident from their lellers. The frequent use of the plural pronoun is 
accompanied at the letters' end by Ii ts of signatures- bold identifications with a 
collectivity which has openly violated the law. Arendtian power is characterized by the 
creation of COl11l11unity. Shlllinislilll constilUte an ahemative cOl11l11unity, a group of 
individuals gathered together in opposition to militari sm and occupation. Finally, the 
poetic agency of Shlllinislilll qualifies as care for the self. The practice of care for the self 
is characterized by introspection, by treating one's selfas a work of art to which one 
adds, subtracts, and adjusts in accordance with one 's own understanding. The care for the 
self rejects the imposition of identities with which it finds faull. Shlllinislilll do all of these 
things. They interrogate their own convictions, the norms of society, the practices of 
occupation, the meaning of defense and the collective, and having made the 
interrogations, Shlllinislilll reject the identities with which they are presented. They 
decide to constitute themselves through practices and positions of their own development 
and understanding. They engage in self-guided self invention, not blind adherence to 
militari zed nonns. Shminislilll , in short, not on ly engage in the exercise of poetic agency, 
but they do so in everyday fashion, actualizing power and caring for self in the process. 
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Palestinian youth have been discursively constructed as resisters to occupation since at 
least the first intifada. Over time, thi s discourse of resister has taken on increasi ngly 
violent connotations, especially following the advent of martyrdom operations. In this 
case study, I first trace the rise of the resister di scourse as a discourse of Palest inian 
youth. I then map the discursive merger of violence and resistance and the subsequent 
inscription of this hybrid discourse onto Palestinian youth. Following this process of 
di cursive identification, I present the case of Palestinian youth living in Bethlehem's 
Dhei heh refugee camp. These youth. I argue, are exercising poetic agency and remaking 
di scourses of youth within Palestinian symbolic space. Through everyday processes such 
as rapping, storytelling, dancing, and the like, youth in Dheisheh camp are making and 
transmitting meanings, revealing thei r identities, creating communities, and constituting 
themselves through their conduct. 
John Collins argues that since the advent of the illlifada, Palestinian youth have have 
been " understood, categorized. researched, and symbolically appropriated" by a certain 
number of "rhetorical modes," i.e., by certain number of discourses (2004: 38). 
Especially notable among them is the discourse of hero, a discourse which was inscribed 
onto Palestinian youth, especially male youth, during the intifada (Abu Farha 2009; 
Bucaille 2004; Collins 2004; Peteet 1994). Youth who took up stones against Israeli tanks 
have been mythologized in Palestinian di scourse, transformed into "children of the 
stones,' heroic figures who not only resisted Israeli occupation, but who also sent 
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symbolic messages abroad, especially to the United States and to Arab regimes negligent 
in their concern for the Palestinian plight. The discourse of hero appropriated the actions 
of these youth. Vexing soldiers, enduring beatings, and going to prison became heroic 
acts. The discourse of youth as hero which emerged from the intifada was predominantly 
male, tied to symbol ic violence, and associated with enduring suffering for the 
Palestinian cause. 
The connotations attached to the discourse underwent dramatic changes in the 
decade following the intifada, a process which culminated in the second uprising of the 
early millenium (Abufarha 2009). Many Palestinian youth were disenchanted with the 
Oslo Accords. Within Palestinian society, youth were frustrated by political exclusion 
and by attempts to reset social hierarchies which had been been upset during the intifada 
(Bucaille 2004). Winning the support of the international community appeared to many 
to have been a worthless endeavor. These conditions led some to make a tactical shift 
from symbolic to overt violence. Martyrdom operations began in 1994, and during the 
ensuing decade, those who executed them were elevated in Palestinian discourse 
(Abufarha 2009). Increasingly, the discourse of hero took on violent connotations. In his 
ethnography of Palestinian resistance, Abufarha notes the rise of the "istishhadi," the 
"martyrous one," an "active notion that emphasizes the heroism in the act of sacrifice": 
The istishhadiyeen have captured the imagination of Palestinian youth and 
the general public .... The istishhadi now carries new meanings and 
qualities above that of the shahiel. The image of the istishhadi is the icon 
of the Palestinian resistance, replacing the icon of the shahid of the first 
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illlifada and the notion jida 'i, which was the icon of resistance in the 
I 960s and 1970s. (Abufarha 2009: 10) 
The discourse of iSlishhadi has displaced the discourses of shahid andfida 'i which 
previolls ly dominated the symbol ic space of Palestinian resistance. For Palestinians, 
"shahid" refers to "anyone killed by the aggressor" (2009: 8). The shahid, then, cou ld be 
read as the "martyr" (2009: 9). Conversely, the iSlishhadi is not the "martyr" but rather 
the " martyrous one." The move from sllClhid to iSlishhadi is a move in which personal 
agency is added: "The iSlishhadi, the hero who carries 0 111 a sacrifice mission. is active, 
whereas the shahid of the first intifada was a viclim at the hands of the Israelis" (2009: 
77-78). The notion of the iSlishhadi carries with it the meaning of"self-sacrifice" which 
characterized the jida'i. the "one who sacrifices self' (2009: 8). The iSlishhadi, then. 
combines the notion of sacrifice with the notion of personal agency. Acting intentionall y 
and honorably, the marly rolls one are to be esteemed and emulated rather than pitied. 
The former has been the response of Palestinian society. As Abufarha goes on to note, 
images and narratives of the iSlishhadi are circulated by youth groups, schools, and 
activist communities through photos, notebooks. postcards, booklets. videos, and 
websites, " memorializing the new life ofthe martyr in the wider community" (2009: 78). 
He ob erves that the "discourse of marty rdom has achieved such power that the cultural 
dynamic is defining the form of engagement and resistance, forcing it on some groups 
and reorgani zing society" (2009: 195). The di scourse of the iSlishhadi, then, is 
threatening to monopolize the meanings of resistance. Those who wish to be considered 
resisters are pressured to confonn to the violent connotations of the martyrdom discourse: 
"To be recognized as a resistance faction , Palestinian groups are compelled to participate 
67 
•• 
in the perfonnance of martyrdom (2009: 195). It is through the discourse of the islishhadi 
that the discourse of youth as hero has taken on violent connotations. 
Following Abufarha, the martyrdom discourse is being forced upon Palestinian 
youth as it consumes the conceptual space of resistance (2009: 195). For those who 
would be widely recognized as resisters, participation in the discourse of martyrdom is 
the most certain route to success. This is suggested most strongly by the conspicuous 
displays Abufarha mentions. Throughout Palestinian space, visual markers elevate the 
islishhadi to the pinnacle of resistance. The coercion of youth into the discourse of 
martyrdom is also suggested by the statements of youth themselves. Asked how they are 
portrayed and understood by others, Palestinian youth will often respond they are 
represented mainly as terrorists. For example, the members of the organization Gaza 
Youth Breaks Out state in their manifesto that they are "sick of being portrayed as 
terrori sts, home-made fanatics with ex plosives in our pockets and evil in our eyes" (Gaza 
Youth Breaks Out 20 II ). This statement is representati ve of the frustrations of many 
Palestinian youth. As the members ofGaza Youth Breaks Out suggest, the association of 
Palestinian youth with terrorism is something which is not necessarily to blamed on the 
iSlishhadi, but rather on external makers of meaning-those who first inscribe "martyrous 
ones" with "evil" intent and then generalize the category onto Palestinian youth. There 
are, then, two distinct acts of inscription at work. First, because of the acts of the 
iSlishhadi, Palestinian youth are associated with a discourse of violent resistance. Second, 
because of manipulations of meaning arising from outside of Palestinian society, this 
discourse of violent resistance is then further inscribed with connotations of evil , 
irrationality, and fanaticism. For their part , Palestinian youth take greater issue with the 
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imposition of the second of these di scourses than they do with the imposition of the first. 
They do not mind so much association with the "martyrous ones" as they do association 
with tcrrorists. If Palestinian youth allemptcd to distance themselves from the iSlishhadi 
discourse, such an attempt might very well obstruct the inscription of the terrori st 
di scourse, given the links betwecn the two. However, following Abufarha, such a 
distancing is not a likely course of action given the reverence with which the iSlishhadi 
are considered by Palestinians. This revercnce, thcn, is in a sense that which allows the 
terrorist discourse to circulate. If the iSlishhadi were not revered, there would be less 
symbolic space from which the terrorist discourse could emerge. Although Palestinian 
youth may not be quick to consciously oppo e the discourse of islishhadi, this does not 
necessarily mean that Palestinian youth arc nOt remaking the discourse unintentionally. 
As I argue below, through nothing other than everyday exercises of poetic agency, 
Palestini an youth are reshaping discourses which would inscribe violent corlilotations 
upon them. 
The discourse of Palestinian youth as a violent resister is being remade by the poetic 
agency of Palestinian youth. Acts of overt violence, though discursively elevated, are not 
deployed by most. Rather, the forms of political action undertaken by Palestinian youth 
are overwhelmingly nonviolent. They are not heroic acts, but rather everyday practices of 
poetic agency. Through thi s agency, Palestinian youth incrementally redefine the 
discourses with which they are inscribed, making meanings for themselves which do not 
center upon heroism and violence. Crucially, this is not to say that Palestinian youth. like 
the Shmillislim, intentionally oppose the discourses they are remaking. As Abufarha 
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n tes. the i.\lishllll(/i are revered in popu lar di course. The poetic agency of Palestinian 
youth, then, is n t a normalive rejection of the discourse of violent resister, but rather an 
unsuspecting remaking of itthrollgh poetic agency. Ilere. then. is a case demonstrating 
the Arendtian thesis that political action need nol. like resistance, be intentional in ils 
• 
exercise. 
As suggc ted by the mural captured in Figure I above, it is through everyday 
practices f poetic agency that the youth li vi ng in Dhei heh overwhelmingly exercise 
thei r political a tion. In the follo\\ing narrative. Musa, a youth of the camp, describes in 
detail the manifestation poetic agency takes in his a Is and in the acls of his friends: 
F r me. when you live under the pressure of the occupation. many people 
become ... children have pressure inside themselves. I have friends painting 
walls, friends doing art- they are really amazing, trying to see the 
intemational people to take them to sell- friends who are rappers, talking 
about life inside the camp. how they love and hate. how they want and 
d n' t want [to be here) .... Young people here have many hobbies-
basketball. football. \ olle) ball .... People use the internet to study. keep 
them in touch with friends, you can still connect with them for years. You 
can the internet to talk about yourself. You can use Facebook. People 
don't know that there is a country who e name is Palestine. I add people 
[on Facebook) every week, every two weeks . ... 
Through dancing. YOll show other about Palestine. about yourself. ome 
guns. some use stones. some u e dancing. Dancing is a peaceful way. 
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- - - --------_._-----_._ .. _-----
If you use a gun or a stone, they say you are a terrorist. People enjoy 
dancing. They clap for you. They respect dancing. So we choose this- to 
go around the world and tell about Palestine. People start to cry, love us, 
love what we are doing. They give us presents and gifts. They know we 
are under occupation .... 
An Italian photographer came and taught us how to talk about ourselves 
through video, through media. Jews and Israelis have many media and 
they talk about us. They say we are terrorists .. . I saw the internationals, 
they would bring cameras, they would write, and go outside and tell our 
story. I learned from them . . . through this you can talk about yourself...My 
father saw the Italians make a movie about me. He was happy. He saw that 
our story was told . My parents feel happy and they support me in 
everything . ... 
There was a workshop in the past. Girls were using microphones and 
cameras. People started to laugh when they got back in the camp. Some 
people started to laugh. Maybe they thought it was a bullshit way. But 
after all this I don ' t feel hopeless. I know what I am doing is a good way. I 
don't give a shit. I know my way. Here, they see a movie about me. They 
don't laugh. They see that I told our stories, about our lives in the camp. 
Then they tell me I'm sorry about that because I didn't know that you 
would do this .... 
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Here inside the camp there are many old people. One man is older than 
100 years. The most important thing for me is the old people. They have 
the history of Palestine. They know the history of the land. They are like a 
book. There was an old man, when he died, you felt like you were missing 
him. Every year we celebrate the Nakba days. We have music and songs. 
Through this you tell the stories through generations. They give you hope, 
a way to fight , real information about your land .. . . These days many old 
people have died. When I did photography and video I would go to them. 
They would tell us stories, tell us about the past and life in forty-eight, 
about the food , the vegetables- they didn't cost anything. I have land and 
I grow fruit and vegetables and I have water and wells and I smell the 
fresh air. When you sit with them, you imagine you have lived this life 
before. You feel you are li ving inside a paradise .... One day I asked an 
old man ifhe had land ifhe would go back. He said yes. He said today I 
have nothing to do. He told me about the fruit, how he would just go and 
pick them . ... They are really good stories. When I get older I will do what 
they did. We have good connections with others. 
Musa's narrative delineates a multiplicity of practices being deployed daily by 
Palestinian youth as poetic agency. Whether Musa and these youth realize it or not, their 
discursive production not only resists occupation, but also remakes discourses of youth. 
Far from heroics, youth living in Dheisheh u e artwork, rap, sports, social media, 
dancing, video, and storytelling to exert themselves in a symbolic politics. For Musa, it is 
not necessarily that youth who use stones and guns are wrong to do so. Rather, youth 
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simpl y prefer different fonns of political action. Musa suggests there are tactical benefits 
to everyday, nonviolent practice. For example, one might avoid being labeled a terrorist. 
Additionally, alternative practices can further certain ends. Uploading videos to the 
internet provides Palestinian youth a way to combat Israeli media. In the case of dance, 
youth can win over audiences to the Palestinian cause. Through storytelling, youth not 
only produce discourse, but also reshape it across generations. For Musa, storytelling 
transmits possibilities, builds solidarity, gives hope, and provides information for 
political action. It recall s memories and thereby reveals the present as historically 
situated , a reality able to be changed, one that can be evaluated against possibilities 
contained in the past. Finally, within Musa's narrative is a willingness to transgress 
norms. When hi s practice is laughed at, Musa does not feel hopeless. Rather, he 
maintains confidence in hi s "way" unt il others reali ze its value. That his resi stance is 
derided locates it outside of dominant discourses. That it is eventually recognized 
suggests the work of poetic agency. 
Musa's narrative reveals a multiplicity of political actions being undertaken by 
Pale tinian youth that constitute poetic agency. In addition to meeting all of the necessary 
conditions for its actualization. these political actions often realize the "particular 
manifestations" of poetic agency outlined previously. 
The actualization of natality is, in at least many of the acts described by Musa, 
almost self-evident. Rapping, making visual art, producing performative pieces- these 
are all thoroughly creative acts. And not only do they create physically, but they also 
create symbolically. Through murals such as that included above, through the spread of 
rap through cyberspace, through the perfonnance of theatre and dance to international 
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audiences-through acts such as these Palestinian youth create and remake meanings, 
exercising natality. In these cases, the symbolic transmissions at work are apparent. 
Through visual. auditory, and digital avenues, Palestinian youth break into the symbolic 
world, remaking its fabric and projecting their creations for others to see. 
Although, as Arendt notes, the di sclosure of the "who" takes place in many 
unrecognized, everyday acts, it is especiall y salient here in processes such as storytelling 
and rapping. In giving an account of one's self through speech, the unique identity of the 
agent is revealed explicitly. Additionally, the "who" is di sclosed in less obvious ways in 
the practices Musa describes, for example, in the particular forms less obviously 
discursive acts assume. The ways in which Palestinian youth choose to interact in sport , 
in performance. and in the use of social media all obtain in virtue of the assertion of 
distinctness. 
Through collective action such as the formation of Facebook groups, the 
participatory construction of mural s, and dance perfomlance, youth in Dheisheh actualize 
Arendtian power. In doing so, they bring into being a space of "organized remembrance" 
in which they can create meaning and infuse events and realities with symbolisms of their 
own. Exercising both aspects of Arendtian power, the youth in Dheisheh also build 
community through their actions, making networks of friends on Facebook, connecting 
with audiences around the world, sharing thei r stories with visitors to their camp, and so 
forth. 
Through their conduct, youth in Dheisheh throw off imposed identities as they 
constitute themselves through the care for the self. Not accepting the di scourse of violent 
resister for themselves, the youth who engage in the practices Musa describes participate 
74 
in an alternative politics through which they invent themselve as political agents in the 
world. Musa, for instance. though mocked, is certain of the legitimacy of his "way," of 
his fonn of political action. Those who, like Musa, select fonns of poetic agency against 
those offered by circulating discourses of violent resistance demonstrate the ort of self-
invention through self-understanding that is characteristic of the care for the self. 
A final interesting feature of the poetic agency Musa describes is that many of the 
youth exercising it appear unaware of the full symbolic effects of their actions. While 
these youth consciously target occupation through their murals, dance perfonnance, and 
the like, they do not necessarily target imposing discourses of youth within their own 
society as oppositional entities in need of remaking. Nonetheless, this remaking is a 
consequence of their exercise of poetic agency. While the lack of intention might not 
allow this particular aspect of their act to be considered resistance, it can nevertheless stil l 
count as political action following Arendt. 
The focus given here to the political actions of youth living in Dheisheh camp is not 
meant to obscure a great number of similar practices being undertaken by Palestinian 
youth throughout Palestinian space. Youth in Balata camp south of ablus produce 
works of art on alley walls even narrower than those found in Dheisheh. In Jenin camp to 
the north, youth perfonn in the Jenin Freedom Theatre, and others participate in the 
dramatic space of Ci nema Jenin. In these camps, as elsewhere, youth readily share stories 
with visitors, making meanings and building relationships. In cities such as I-lebron, and 
in villages such as Beit Omar and Bil ' in, youth arc on the frontlines of small scale, 
weekly non-violent demonstrations against the segregation of urban space and the 
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annexation of fannland. Youth gather together in Ramallah to smoke and watch football 
as they discuss politics. On the outskins of the city, at Berzeit university, youth undenake 
political action through student organizations despite the repeated arrests of their student 
leaders. Youth at al-Quds University give tours of their museum to visitors, relaying to 
them the history of the detention and torture of Palestinians in Israeli pri sons. The 
members ofGaza Youth Breaks Out publi sh online manifestos and harness social media 
to make meanings and build communities. Young women form economic collectives that 
produce scarves, blankets, and embroidery. In less organized form takes place an 
invisible mass of poetic actions. Youth negotiate checkpoints, replant trees, care for 
sibli ngs, build homes, write poetry, play spons, manipulate social media, take 
photographs, tell stories, traverse walls, go to school, paint murals, and make music. 
Neither the extent nor the efficacy of these actions is easy to assess. However, these 
actuali zations of poetic agency remain political nonetheless, making meanings, di sclosing 
and constituting identities, and building relationships. 
• 
Against discourses of youth circulating in their given societies, Israeli and Palestinian 
youth exercise a poetic agency which reshapes and transmits meaning. Groups of youth 
such as Shminislim and the youth in Dheisheh actualize natality through the creation of 
new discourse, new communities, and new visual and perfomlative symbols. By boldly 
declaring their own principles, values, ethical codes, ways of poli tical action, and so 
fonh, these Israeli and Palestinian youth disclose the "who;' revealing to others their 
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distinct identities. By building communities of like minded youth, by reaching out 
digitally across the world, and by sharing stories with passersby, Israeli and Palestinian 
youth actualize Arendtian power and assign meaning. Through inspecting, rejecting, and 
replacing discursively available identities, these youth care for the self. They invent 
themselves through their conduct, redefining what it means to be a youth in their 
respective soc ieties. All of this political action is done in everyday fashion- through 
quotidian refusals works of art, stories, act ivities, and so forth. Israeli and Palestinian 
youth exercise political action through poetic agency, altering tbe distribution of 
resources in the symbolic world and thereby remaking the material world, too. ot 
contractual defenders or violent resisters, the Israeli and Palestinian youth presented here 
are poetic agents who assert themselves through creative, symbolic, and everyday acts 





Breaking from traditional conceptions of the political , poetic agency is to be found in 
creati ve, symbolic, revelatory acts. Poeti c agency happens in the everyday, in small, often 
overlooked practices through which indi viduals negotiate their surroundings and make 
their way through the world. Poetic agency is characterized by building community and 
by caring for the self. Through poetic agency, individuals enter into new, constructive, 
non-coercive relations with one another. They refashion themselves in accordance with 
their own understanding. 
The theory of poetic agency emerges from the synthesis of Arendt, Scott, and 
Foucault. From the first of these theoretical systems poetic agency takes its foundations. 
Arendt 's theory of action provides the three necessary conditions for poetic agency. It 
also provides one of its " particular manifestations": Arendtian power. From Scott, 
Arendt's theory learns to look for the political not in political actions as traditionally 
conceived, but rather in the everyday processes of life. The tensions involved with 
intention and political action emerge, and the category of resistance is distinguished from 
that of political action. Foucault provides the microphysics of poetic agency. His theories 
of discourse and power reveal the characteri stics of the symbolic world. Foucault 
articulates why it is that poetic agency is political, and he provides an account of one 
manifestation poetic agency mi ght assume, namely, the care for the self. 
Israeli and Palestinian youth are poetic agents who actualize natali ty, make and 
transmit meaning, and reveal their unique identities. In the case studies examined here, 
78 
&4=.= auahl $ 
they do so in opposition to discourses of youth which would limit them and confine them, 
discourses not of their own making. By inspecting the discourses of contractual defender 
and violent resister, by determining these di scourses to be unfit for themselves, and by 
rejecting the identities offered by these discourses for identities of their own making, 
Israeli and Palestinian youth care for the self in acts of self-inventing political act ion. The 
new di scourses which they create using letters, symbolic endurances of punishment, 
visual and performative artworks, social media, storytelling, and the like-are 
expre sions of the unique identities they have fashioned for themselves. It is through the 
assertion of distinctness that Israeli and Palestinian youth reject and remake discourses of 
youth ci rculating within their societies. In exercising their poetic agencies, these youth 
build communities among themselves and across borders, transmitting meanings and 
inscribing anew characteristics onto the symbolic world. 
The exercise of poetic agency departs fTom many norms of political action 
tradit ionally conceived. Poetic agency, though present in the occasional, organized event, 
is most often to be found on the streets, in the school. in the camp, online, and on the 
wall. Although often difficult to pinpoint its effects, poetic agency carries consequences 
nonetheless, remaking both the symbolic and material worlds. "The limitations of any 
field of study are most strikingly revealed in its shared definitions of what counts as 
relevant," Scon wTites. If nothing else, a theory of poetic agency perfomls this revelatory 
task, forcing us to critically interrogate our paradigms of the political. If these paradigms 
would exclude the poetic agencies arti culated here, then they themselves are complicit in 
acts of repression against which there is need for political action. 
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